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ABSTRACT
CROSS-CULTURAL ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE:
WHEN ARE FAIRNESS PERCEPTIONS UNIVERSAL OR CULTURALLY
DEPENDENT?
FEBRUARY 2016
KIRK D. SILVERNAIL, B.A. AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
M.B.A. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Jane K. Miller

Organizational justice research over the last fifty years has provided an
understanding of the antecedents and outcomes of fairness perceptions within
organizational contexts. Justice perceptions have proven to be related to important
outcomes such as job performance, organizational commitment, and withdrawal
behaviors. Initial research seemed to indicate a certain universality of justice perceptions
in that they had similar antecedents and consequences regardless of country or culture.
However, a burgeoning cross-cultural justice literature now shows that some fairness
perceptions may actually be culturally dependent. The question therefore remains as to
when fairness perceptions are culturally variant or invariant.
The current research investigates three overarching questions. First, are justice
perceptions universal or are they affected by cultural values? Second, is there an
interactive effect of cultural dimensions on justice perceptions? Third, what is the
relationship between cross-cultural faculty governance differences and perceptions of
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fairness? Two studies were conducted to answer these research questions. One was
qualitative and used semi-structured interviews of university faculty to provide an initial
answer to both the first and third research questions. The other was quantitative and used
survey responses collected from business school faculty to answer the second research
question and provide a more complete answer to the other two questions.
Results of the studies indicate that there is wide variation in faculty governance
systems. However, the perceived fairness of those governance systems may be dependent
on the aspect of the employment relationship being investigated. Evidence found here
suggests there may be certain core values of a profession that when absent from the
employment relationship are seen as unfair regardless of country. On the other hand,
evidence also suggests that the perceived fairness of some aspects of the employment
relationship may be culturally dependent. Additionally, evidence showed that the
antecedent relationship between cultural dimensions and justice variables may be limited.
This research not only furthers the theoretical understanding of the relationship between
culture and justice but also cross-cultural fairness responses to varying human resource
practices.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade there has been an increase in research studying the
relationship between culture and organizational justice (Greenberg, 2011). Although
much of the initial organizational justice research was conducted in Western contexts
[mostly in the United States (US)], it has been found that fair1 outcomes and procedures
are significantly related to outcome variables in multiple cultural contexts (Li &
Cropanzano, 2009). However, Li and Cropanzano (2009) also found that the strength of
the relationship between justice and work outcomes appears to be different crossculturally. This speaks to the idea of how the salience of justice differs cross-culturally
and evidence to support these differences was found in a recent meta-analytical study.
Specifically, the meta-analysis demonstrated that justice perceptions were more strongly
related to outcomes in some countries than in others (Fischer, 2013). Thus, although it
appears that fairness is important no matter the cultural context, there are differences in
how justice manifests itself cross-culturally. However, many of the cultural differences to
this point are only understood in terms of their role as moderators/mediators in justiceoutcome relationships, not in their direct effects on justice perceptions. Thus, although it
is worth discussing how scholars have begun to understand the cross-cultural differences
in justice perceptions the full effect of culture on justice perceptions is not well
established.
One of the methods used to explicate these differences has focused on cultural
values (Hofstede, 1980a, 2001). Cultural values are defined as the patterns of thinking,
1

Consistent with organizational justice literature, I use fairness and justice
interchangeably.
1

feeling and acting that are shared by individuals from the same nation (Hofstede, 2001;
Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). It is also important to point out here the difference
between culture and country. There have been calls to distinguish between the terms
cross-cultural and cross-national as the latter is often used as a proxy for culture assuming
that national boarders define homogeneous cultural groups (Nasif, Al-Daeaj, Ebrahimi, &
Thibodeaux, 1991). However, many of the cross-cultural studies are actually crossnational consisting of individuals from different cultural backgrounds grouped based on
national or country boarders thus conflating cross-cultural with cross-national. To be
clear, although to a certain extent I use the terms cross-cultural and cross-national
interchangeably in theory development, the research conducted here falls explicitly
within the cross-national context.
Research utilizing the Hofstede (1980a) cultural dimensions has shown that
national culture impacts many important aspects of organizational life such as conflict
resolution preferences, human resource practices, leadership style preference, and
organizational citizenship behaviors, to name a few [for a full review see Kirkman, Lowe,
& Gibson (2006)]. Most importantly for the proposed research, it has also been shown to
impact the relationship between perceptions of justice and organizational outcome
variables (Kirkman et al., 2006). However, the studies cited in Kirkman et al. (2006) all
used country or the cultural dimensions as mediators/moderators in the relationship
between justice perceptions and outcome variables. Research investigating the main
effects of cultural dimensions on fairness perceptions (Hang-yue, Foley, & Loi, 2006;
Ramamoorthy, Gupta, Sardessai, & Flood, 2005) has also shown that cultural values have
an impact on fairness perceptions. This is supported by theory that suggests that national
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origin can be a source of a considerable amount of common mental programming
(Hofstede et al., 2010). That is, cultural values will have an important influence on justice
perceptions or what is perceived as fair treatment for members of the same nation.
Furthermore, although current research using cultural values has extended our
understanding of cross-cultural justice, there are still differences that have yet to be
explained. Specifically, “the current body of research on this topic fails to suggest
precisely when, why, and how culture’s influences on justice are exerted” (Greenberg,
2011, p. 306). I seek to address this gap by proposing the main and interactive effects of
all six of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions in order to predict cross-cultural variations in
justice effects, an undertaking that has yet to be attempted (Shao, Rupp, Skarlicki, &
Jones, 2013).
The interaction of cultural dimensions is an important aspect to consider because
culture does not exist in isolation (Leung, Bhagat, Buchan, Erez, & Gibson, 2005). That
is, individuals do not consist of one cultural dimension or value that is in isolation of
others but instead these dimensions make up part of a multi-layered, multi-faceted
cultural identity (Leung et al., 2005). Therefore, explicating the manner in which cultural
values interact will give a more complete picture of how culture impacts perceptions of
justice.
In order to conduct this research, a unique context in which to test the impact of
cultural values on justice perceptions lies within universities. Specifically, the manner of
faculty governance in terms of hiring processes, promotions, and pay raises is different
institution to institution and country to country. In order to fully understand how fairness
exists in cross-cultural settings, triangulation (Jick, 1979) was used. Thus, two studies

3

were conducted. The first used interviews to establish the extent to which faculty
governance differs country to country and how fairly this is viewed. The second tested
the effect of cultural values on perceptions of justice. This research therefore adds to our
understanding of the relative fairness of differing faculty governance systems and
expands the cross-cultural justice literature by further determining the impact of cultural
values on justice perceptions.
The remainder of this introductory chapter presents a short overview of the
organizational justice literature as it is understood in Western contexts. A review of how
this understanding differs in cross-cultural organizational justice literature is then
presented. A discussion of the research plan follows. The chapter concludes with a
discussion of the faculty governance context in the US.

Organizational Justice
Although the concept of fairness has been discussed by academics and
philosophers through much of human history, it was not until the past sixty or so years
that the concept emerged in management literature (Colquitt, Greenberg, & ZapataPhelan, 2005). Interestingly, it appears that the response to fairness is relatively automatic
(Tabibnia, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008). That is, reactions to (un)fairness initiate
affective responses in reward areas of the brain (Dulebohn, Conlon, Sarinopoulos,
Davison, & McNamara, 2009; Tabibnia et al., 2008). This finding is of particular import
for organizations as within the workplace people are often faced with potential (un)fair
situations and reactions to judgments about those situations have far reaching
implications (Greenberg, 1996). Particularly, employees within organizations often seek
to determine the fairness of their rewards, appraisal systems and their relative treatment
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(Greenberg, 2011). Indeed, research suggests that there are four dimensions of
organizational justice (Colquitt, 2001).
The first of these dimensions is distributive justice, which refers to the fairness of
rewards received for given inputs (Adams, 1965; Homans, 1961). The second is
procedural justice, which is the fairness of the procedures used to determine reward
distribution (Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). The third and fourth dimensions
are collectively known as interactional justice and are named interpersonal justice, which
is the relative treatment of the individual and informational justice, which is the extent to
which explanations are clear when outcomes are explained (Bies & Moag, 1986). Within
organizational contexts, these dimensions have been shown to impact important work
outcomes such as job performance, organizational commitment, organizational
citizenship behaviors, retaliation and turnover intentions amongst other outcomes [For a
complete review see Greenberg (2011)]. However, much of the research investigating the
conceptualization and outcomes of organizational justice was initially conducted in
Western contexts (Greenberg, 2001). I now review the cross-cultural studies that have
been conducted since this gap was identified almost fifteen years ago.

Cross-cultural Organizational Justice
A burgeoning literature has followed Greenberg (2001) lamenting the lack of
coherence in the cross-cultural justice literature. This has resulted in three interwoven
lines of research. The first revolves around explicating when the justice-organizational
outcome relationship differs in non-Western contexts, the second investigates how the
four justice dimensions are defined cross-culturally, and the third investigates various
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cultural factors that influence justice perceptions. This section outlines the first two of
these literature streams. The third is used in hypothesis development in Chapter II.
A study conducted in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), found that distributive
and procedural justice were positively linked to job satisfaction and organizational
commitment and negatively related to turnover intention (Elanain, 2010). Consistent with
Western studies, procedural justice was more strongly related to organizational
commitment than distributive justice. Furthermore, in a study of employees from the US
and Bangladesh, little difference was found in the reaction between the two groups when
it came to the effects of organizational justice on organizational commitment and
turnover intentions (Rahim, Magner, Antonioni, & Rahman, 2001). A meta-analysis of
studies conducted in the US and East Asia concluded that distributive and procedural
justice are also related to affective organizational commitment, job satisfaction,
supervisor/organizational trust, and turnover intentions in both US and non-US contexts
(Li & Cropanzano, 2009). These findings suggest that distributive and procedural justice
exist with similar consequences across US and Asian cultures.
However, although the relationships between organizational justice and
organizational outcomes have been shown to hold outside of the US (Morris & Leung,
2000) and similarities have been found in the above mentioned articles, there is also
evidence of cultural differentiation. For example, contrary to Western studies, procedural
justice was more strongly related to job satisfaction than distributive justice in the UAE
(Elanain, 2010). Additionally, Li and Cropanzano (2009) showed that the strength of the
relationship between justice and outcome variables differs cross-culturally. Specifically,
justice perceptions were more strongly related to outcome variables in North America
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than they were in the Asian sample. Furthermore, in a study of Taiwanese and US
employees, Bidder, Chang, and Tyler (2001) found that reactions to procedural justice
were similar across the samples, with Taiwanese employees slightly less likely to
retaliate against the organization as a result of procedural injustice. Finally, using the
Sweeney and McFarlin (1993) two-factor model in which distributive justice was linked
to job satisfaction and procedural justice was linked to organizational commitment for a
US sample, distributive justice was also shown to impact intent to stay and evaluation of
supervisor in a sample of employees from Hong Kong (Reithel, Baltes, & Buddhavarapu,
2007). In the Reithel et al. (2007) study, procedural justice is actually a mediator of the
distributive justice/job satisfaction relationship for the Hong Kong sample. Taken
together, these studies demonstrate that justice outcomes vary cross-culturally as do the
relationships between justice variables and outcomes. Additionally, as procedural justice
has been shown to act as a mediator in the distributive justice/job satisfaction relationship
and therefore an antecedent to job satisfaction in some countries and not in others this
suggests cross-cultural variation in justice judgment antecedents.
The above research furthers our understanding of when justice perceptions differ
cross-culturally as the studies outline the differences between justice in Western countries
versus in other countries. The second line of cross-cultural justice research looks at how
the justice dimensions differ cross-culturally. Some of this research has been outcome
based and revolves around reward allocation preference (distributive justice).
The Fischer and Smith (2003) meta-analytical review showed that there are
reward allocation differences across cultures suggesting that cultural differences in
perceptions of justice have a role in shaping what fair allocations of rewards are. This

7

was demonstrated in a study of employees from the United Kingdom (UK) and what was
formerly East Germany, employees that exhibit more individualistic traits found
performance based reward allocation as fairer than those who exhibit more collectivistic
traits (Fischer & Smith, 2004).2 In looking at the effects of distributive justice, although
the concept appears for Japanese individuals, the sense of what is fair in the distribution
of rewards is quite different than the Western sense. That is, the Japanese are more likely
to choose an equal split of rewards compared to their US counterparts (Benjamin, 2011).
Benjamin (2011) indicates that this is likely due to the fact that the Japanese are raised to
think more about the collective society than their US counterparts. Furthermore, it has
been shown that Russian managers make similar allocation decisions compared to their
US counterparts when working in international joint ventures (IJVs) (Giacobbe-Miller,
Miller, Zhang, & Victorov, 2003). However, when working in state owned enterprises
which traditionally emphasized egalitarian reward distribution, the Russian managers in
Giacobbe-Miller et al. (2003) were more likely to emphasize egalitarian and need based
reward allocation. On one hand, this suggests that organizational goals may be playing a
role in reward allocation preference as Russian managers in IJVs are exposed to
organizational goals focused on firm performance. Therefore, they are more likely to
prefer equitable rewards as it motivates employees to work to enhance firm performance.
On the other hand, this could also indicate the differentiation of in-group versus outgroup. That is, when working in state-owned enterprises the Russian managers are
working with other Russians but when working in IJVs the Russian managers are
working with people who are not Russian. This difference may then indicate the

2

This study used cultural dimensions at the individual level.
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preference to reward those in your in-group in line with the cultural norms of your ingroup but reward effort when no in-group alliance is present. Either way it suggests that
there may be cultural differences in heuristics used when determining fairness. The above
findings are also mirrored in research conducted in China.
In a study of perceptions of pay fairness within IJVs in China, when comparing
salaries to other Chinese employees, employees of the IJV had higher perceptions of
justice than when they compared salaries to expatriate employees (C. C. Chen, Choi, &
Chi, 2002). This finding can in part be explained by ownership change which has
increased employee preference for equitable based rewards in China and subsequently
reduces employee preference for equal rewards (He, Chen, & Zhang, 2004). Additionally,
the He et al. (2004) study showed that as the goal of the organization moved towards a
productivity orientation, the preference for equitable rewards increased.
Indeed, again in the Chinese context, there has been a shift from a preference for
equality based reward allocation to a preference for equity based rewards (Y. Chen,
Friedman, Yu, & Sun, 2011). The Y. Chen et al. (2011) study demonstrated that the
“guanxi”3 practices of the Chinese were seen as fair at the personal level but unfair when
practiced at the group level. That is, individuals thought it was fair when they alone
received guanxi preference but not when the standard for human resource decisions was
based highly on guanxi practices. This further suggests that perceptions of justice may be
related to group membership like was found with the Russian managers in GiacobbeMiller et al. (2003) mentioned above. That is, a Chinese employee will be more likely to
see another Chinese employee getting rewards based on guanxi as fair and not have the
3

Guanxi is the tendency in Chinese culture to base business related decisions on personal
relationships.
9

same sense of fairness when an expatriate gets the same guanxi treatment (Koch & Koch,
2007). This suggests that in- and out-group membership does indeed moderate the
relationship between organizational procedures, reward allocation and perceptions of
justice. This also speaks to differences in preferences for the procedures used to arrive at
rewards (procedural justice) and is the second of the justice dimensions that cross-cultural
researchers have investigated.
In an example of procedural justice research conducted outside of the US, an
investigation of the selection techniques used in the hiring of individuals in Italy
indicated that those techniques that had higher validity (i.e. were more related to the
potential job) were seen as more fair (Bertolino & Steiner, 2007). The perceptions of
procedural justice were similar to those found in other countries as in a study of Indian,
US, and Irish MBA students there appeared to be no difference in preference for
procedural fairness across the three countries (Ramamoorthy et al., 2005). Interestingly
though, individualistic orientation was found to be positively related to a preference for
procedural fairness in appraisals and rewards (Ramamoorthy et al., 2005).
This speaks to cross-cultural differences in procedural fairness preferences and
there have been a number of studies that suggest this. For instance, voice in procedures is
one aspect of procedural justice as defined in the seminal work by Thibaut and Walker
(1975) and found in Western empirical research conducted by Greenberg and Folger
(1983). That is, when employees are given voice in the procedures used to arrive at
rewards they find the procedures as fairer than when they are denied voice. However, the
effects of the denial of voice have been shown to vary cross-culturally (Brockner et al.,
2001). A sample comparing French and US employees found that although voice was an
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important factor in fairness perceptions of performance evaluations, interpersonal
responsiveness (defined as the extent to which people felt they were treated with respect
and given appropriate information when receiving explanations about decisions made)
mediated the relationship between voice and decision fairness for US employees and not
for French employees (Fodchuk & Sherman, 2008). The definition of interpersonal
responsiveness in the Fodchuk and Sherman (2008) article is essentially the same as what
Western justice research has coined interactional justice and represents the third and
fourth justice dimensions that cross-cultural justice researchers have investigated.
Returning to the Chinese context, interpersonal justice has been shown to reduce
negative perceptions of justice of Chinese employees regarding pay discrepancy (C. C.
Chen et al., 2002). Additioanlly, perceptions of compensation fairness were positively
related to satisfaction with compensation and negatively related to turnover intentions (C.
C. Chen et al., 2002). Furthermore, in a study conducted in Portugal it was found that
interactional justice might have more of a positive effect on organizational citizenship
behaviors than distributive or procedural justice in cultures high in femininity (Rego &
Cunha, 2010).
The research outlined here seems to support the idea that response to (un)fairness
is automatic (Tabibnia et al., 2008) and one could say that fairness concerns are
universal. It also demonstrates that attention is focused on fairness within organizations.
However, the literature cited above also shows extensive cross-cultural differences in
both organizational outcome variables associated with justice perceptions as well as what
aspects of the four justice dimensions differ cross-culturally. Although these studies
further our understanding of when and why justice differs cross-culturally, we are left
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wondering precisely how culture impacts justice perceptions. One potential method of
pinpointing how culture influences justice is through the use of cultural dimensions. In
the above cited literature, I have made cursory references to two of the Hofstede (1980a)
cultural dimensions. Research utilizing these dimensions is the third area that has
garnered interest for cross-cultural justice researchers and it is through these dimensions
that I attempt to answer the question of precisely how culture impacts justice. Much of
the research utilizing the cultural dimensions looks at them as moderators in the
relationship between justice and its various outcomes. However, to fully explicate the
impact of culture on justice perceptions it is important to understand the effects of
cultural dimensions as antecedents to justice perceptions rather than moderators. This is
the gap in our understanding that the current research seeks to fill. Further literature
review of the known effects of culture on justice will be conducted in Chapter II.
However, I will now proceed with a discussion of the context in which the proposed
research will be conducted as this will help clarify the theoretical development.

Research Plan
The overarching research questions that are investigated here are: Are justice
perceptions universal or are they affected by cultural values? Is there an interactive effect
of cultural dimensions on justice perceptions? And, what is the extent that faculty
governance differs cross-culturally and the effect of these variations on perceptions of
fairness.
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Faculty Governance: A Unique Context
In order to complete this research the context of faculty governance within
universities worldwide was used. This provides a unique lens to investigate fairness
cross-culturally as the manner of faculty governance in terms of hiring processes,
promotions, and pay raises varies from institution to institution and country to country.
These differences provide varying ideas of what is fair as well as allow for the
investigation of the impact of cultural values on justice perceptions. By completing this
research, we have hopefully come to better understand the differences in fairness
perceptions of various faculty governance systems that exist, an area in which there is
currently a dearth of research.
The ideals of academic freedom and university self-governance are of great
import to members of the academic profession not just within the US but also worldwide.
Indeed, these issues have garnered the attention of the United Nations and caused them to
outline the rights of academic institutions and those working within them. Particularly it
is stated that academic personnel should not be hindered in thought or expression and in
order to ensure that academic personnel have these rights, institutions of higher education
should have autonomous self-governance (i.e. be free from national government
interference) (UNESCO, 1997). In addition to institutional governance references, the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) guidelines
state that faculty should have an active role in the governing bodies of higher education
institutions and should be involved in the appraisal of the work of fellow academics
(UNESCO, 1997). This suggests faculty involvement in faculty governance related
issues. The resolutions laid out by UNESCO go on to state that tenure or its equivalent is
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an essential part of maintaining academic freedom and that it should be safeguarded
(UNESCO, 1997). Although these resolutions demonstrate the importance of faculty
governance and academic freedom to academics worldwide, they are simply guidelines
laid out by an independent third-party with limited to no authority over academic
institutions and the various stakeholders of said institutions. They also do not speak to the
perceptions of fairness of the faculty governance systems in place at universities
worldwide.
Perhaps speaking to the importance of academics at a global level, or simply our
drive to understand ourselves, there have been two multi-national studies conducted
investigating faculty’s feelings of the profession as a whole. The first of these was
conducted in 1992 at the behest of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching. The second was a continuation of the first conducted in 2007 as part of the
Changing Academic Profession (CAP) series. The results of the latter survey have been
published as the second volume of The Changing Academy – The Changing Academic
Profession in International Comparative Perspective series. The fact that there is an
entire series (currently consisting of 15 volumes) investigating the life of the academic
speaks to the importance of understanding faculty governance systems, the fairness of
which is a pivotal factor in that understanding.
Interestingly, despite research cited below that speaks to the limits on academic
freedom that exist worldwide, the editors of this volume of The Changing Academy (vol.
2) paint a somewhat rosy picture of academics throughout the world. Specifically, data
has shown that faculty feel as though they are the primary decision makers on most of the
essential decisions relating to research, teaching and service (Cummings, Fisher, &
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Locke, 2011). On one hand this suggests faculty feel they have a certain amount of
authority or power within their institutions over decisions that affect them. On the other
hand, there also seems to be a shift in the balance of power in which academically related
decisions that used to be overseen by faculty or a faculty governing body (such as the
faculty senate) are now being overseen by managers (such as Deans, Presidents, etc.) thus
diluting faculty power (Cummings et al., 2011).
Although this begins to provide a glimpse of faculty governance, the general
comments above regarding faculty governance say little about the specifics or fairness of
this governance. I will return to a discussion of the country level differences in faculty
governance found in this volume of The Changing Academy as well as other research, but
for now it is prudent to establish a common frame of reference from which to make some
comparisons. Therefore, the manner in which faculty governance exists in the US will be
explicated both from the theoretical and practical perspectives as examples from
universities within the US closely embody the UNESCO (1997) principles.
The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) was established in
1915 to set guidelines for faculty governance within institutions of higher education in
the US. Indeed, the AAUP states that its mission is to:
“…advance academic freedom and shared governance; to define fundamental
professional values and standards for higher education; to promote the economic
security of faculty, academic professionals, graduate students, post‐ doctoral
fellows, and all those engaged in teaching and research in higher education; to
help the higher education community organize to make our goals a reality; and to
ensure higher education's contribution to the common good” (American
Association of University Professors, 2014a).
In meeting the goals of this mission the AAUP has issued a number of standards.
These standards provide general guidelines for both the governing of institutions and the
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rights of faculty and those university employees engaged in teaching and research. The
1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure states that teachers are
entitled to full academic freedom both in research and teaching and that with few
exceptions they should be afforded permanent tenure after a probationary period that does
not exceed seven years (American Association of University Professors, 1940).
Importantly, it is also outlined that tenured faculty are afforded due process in instances
of removal (Monahan, 1983). Although, this was an important step in establishing the
rights of faculty within universities in writing and speaks to an aspect of faculty
governance it does not outline faculty governance as a whole.
It should be noted here that although academic freedom and tenure are important
to issues of faculty governance and even guide what appropriate faculty governance looks
like to the extent that they have been called “inextricably linked” (American Association
of University Professors, 1994 p. 143), tenure and faculty governance are two separate
entities. Therefore, in its Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities the
AAUP asserts that faculty status and related matters are the primary responsibility of the
faculty (American Association of University Professors, 1966). That is, all decisions
regarding the hiring, promotion, dismissal, etc. of faculty are to be overseen by fellow
faculty. This covers the theoretical underpinnings of faculty governance within the US.
Now two examples will be given of how this works in practice.
As a means of illustrating how the AAUP guidelines are carried out in practice, I
will delineate the practices of a land-grant university in the Northeast US (referred to as
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U1).4 Potential faculty are interviewed for Assistant Professor positions once they are
close to earning or have earned a Ph.D. (or other terminal degree in their field) (U1,
2005). Although potential colleagues, deans, department chairs and students are involved
in the interviewing process, a hiring committee voted on by and made up of faculty
members from their potential department make the ultimate recommendation as to whom
the department should hire (U1, 2005). This recommendation is made to the hiring
committee chair who then passes the decision on to the Department Chair. The
Department Chair then either rejects or accepts that decision. If the decision is accepted,
then the Department Chair passes on the hiring committee’s recommendation to the
Dean. The Dean then has the same ability to accept or reject and depending on that
decision, the recommendation can then be carried to the Chancellor of U1. Although the
Board of Trustees of the state-wide university system of U1 has ultimate authority over
decisions regarding faculty status on all campuses, that authority has been delegated to
the President of the statewide system (U1, 2005). Therefore, the President of the
statewide system has the final say as to whether or not to hire a new faculty member.
However, consistent with the AAUP guidelines stating that faculty status and related
matters are the primary responsibility of the faculty (American Association of University
Professors, 1966), the U1 “redbook” states that:
“No academic administrative official shall make a recommendation or decision
which is counter to the original faculty recommendation without compelling
reasons in written detail which shall specifically address the content of that
recommendation as well as established standards and criteria. In addition, the
President, in making tenure decisions, should disagree with the campus
recommendation only in rare circumstances” (U1, 1976).

4

This discussion focuses on tenure and tenure track faculty and omits adjunct and
lecturer positions.
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Thus, although department chairs, deans, etc. have approval rights, the fact that any
recommendation that is counter to the faculty committee’s recommendation must be well
defended and only done in “rare” cases suggests that the power for faculty personnel
decisions at U1 does, in fact, rest with the faculty.
Regarding academic freedom and tenure, U1 follows the 1940 Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (outlined above) set forth by the AAUP
(U1, 2005). Assuming that the position being filled is for a junior level faculty
appointment, the new faculty member initially holds the title of Assistant Professor.5
Also, assuming that the new assistant professor is not hired with an accelerated tenure
clock, the seven-year probationary period then begins (this can be paused for certain
circumstances but this is the timeframe the majority of the time). During this time, the
faculty member is expected to perform in three main areas which are research, teaching,
and service to the University and profession (U1, 2005). Faculty are required to complete
an annual report of their work in these areas on which comments are made by an elected
department personnel committee, the Department Chair and the Dean. After their sixth
year/ at the beginning of their seventh year of employment the faculty member submits
their tenure packet for review. In order to be considered for tenure, faculty must be
deemed excellent in two and strength in the third main areas of research, teaching, and
service (U1, 2005). The same procedure as outlined above for the initial hiring is then
initiated again with a faculty committee reviewing the tenure packet (U1, 2005). If the

5

New faculty can be hired in any capacity from assistant to full professor. However, U1
does not allow new faculty to be hired with tenure. There is a waiting period of at least
one year while the tenure packet is reviewed.
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vote is to grant tenure, then the recommendation is advanced to the Department Chair,
then the Dean, etc.
It is important to note here that the concept of tenure in academic institutions was
established to ensure academic freedom. That is, tenure guarantees lifelong employment
barring severe violations of employee conduct (such as failing to fulfill minimum duties)
for faculty members regardless of what they choose to research. This was established as a
way to remove political influences from academia and ensure that academics were free to
research whatever they felt was relevant without fear of retribution (American
Association of University Professors, 1940). This employment guarantee demonstrates
not only the importance of obtaining tenure generally, but the motivation for assistant
professors to obtain it. In addition, the failure to obtain tenure is accompanied by a
terminal contract, a situation of “up or out” for the faculty member.
It is often the case that when tenure is granted, the Assistant Professor is also
promoted to Associate Professor, which comes with an increase in pay. Promotions from
this point on are not on a predetermined time period but instead are faculty-driven.
Additionally, the promotions can be administrative or academic. In the case of the
former, faculty can become department chairs (as voted on by fellow faculty members),
associate deans, deans or take on various other administrative roles. In terms of the
academic advancements, there are academically oriented endowed professorships and the
title of full professor. Both of these are merit-based promotions and are generally given
due to research productivity.
One aspect of the faculty employment relationship that is somewhat unique to U1
compared to other US based universities is the existence of the faculty union. All U1
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faculty are required to join the union (or pay an agency fee without a representative vote)
upon commencing employment (Union, 2012) and in exchange the union provides
faculty with additional protections not provided at all US universities. One example
includes the right of faculty to file grievances against administrative officials who counter
decisions made by faculty committees (Union, 2012).
As a point of comparison, a small, private, liberal arts college (referred to as U2)
has a number of differences in faculty governance compared to U1 even though both
institutions are geographically located close to each other. Although U2 states that they
too hold to the 1940 AAUP principles on academic freedom, their faculty governance
differs from that of U1. For instance, not only do the President and/or the Dean of Faculty
have final say as to whether or not a candidate should be hired for a faculty position, but
they are also involved in interviewing each candidate (U2, 2014). Decisions to grant
promotions and tenure are initiated by ad hoc committees who are appointed by and
report to the President and these decisions are also vetted with a special committee (U2,
2014). This special committee is composed of six faculty members from the university
who are at the assistant, associate or full level and who are voted to be members of the
committee by all of their fellow faculty members from the university as a whole.
Therefore, where much of the power for hiring and promotion at U1 comes from the
faculty of the department that the candidate or faculty member works in, at U2, more of
this power resides with the President and an elected, representative committee composed
of faculty from the entire university. Additionally, where U1 requires excellence in two
of the three categories of research, teaching and/or service, “Effective teaching is
regarded as a prime factor for reappointment and promotion” at U2 (U2, 2014).
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Despite the variation even at institutions located geographically close to one
another, the AAUP standards ensure that much of the faculty governance relationship at
US based universities is standardized. For example most universities hire junior faculty
as assistant professors and then have a seven-year period to determine if tenure should be
granted. Although there have been no studies examining the extent to which this system
is viewed as fair by faculty, given the prevalence of its existence, I expect that many
faculty in the US would see this system as the most fair. Similarly, faculty involvement
or even control over vital personnel processes, as dictated by the AAUP standards, would
likely be seen as fair as it is part of the cultural fabric of academic institutions in the US.
Putting aside the question of faculty governance fairness, the above mentioned
CAP survey results seem to suggest that the AAUP guidelines regarding faculty
involvement in faculty matters have an effect within the US. That is, of the US faculty
represented in the CAP survey, sixty-one percent indicated that faculty bodies were
influential or very influential in choosing new faculty and fifty-one percent indicated the
same influence for making promotion/tenure decisions (Finkelstein, Ju, & Cummings,
2011). This was compared to thirty-three percent and thirty-one percent respectively for
deans and department chairs and six percent and eighteen percent respectively for central
administration and external stakeholders (Finkelstein et al., 2011).6 This demonstrates
that at least on the two issues of choosing new faculty and making promotion/tenure
decisions, faculty feel that they have relatively more power than university authority
figures. Interestingly, there were some differences in these categories in comparing the
1992 survey results to the 2007 survey results with faculty gaining power in promotion
“Faculty Bodies” was not defined but is assumed to include individual faculty, faculty
committees and faculty senates.
6
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decisions and deans and department chairs gaining power in choosing new faculty. These
shifts in power seemed to come with the result of an overall reduction of central
administration and external stakeholder power. This seems to corroborate trends over the
twenty-year period preceding 2001 in which deans, department chairs and faculty in the
US have reported an increase in influence over governance (Finkelstein et al., 2011).
Interestingly, this seems to run counter to CAP results from other countries indicating a
loss of faculty power in this area (Cummings et al., 2011).
The above discussion outlining what would likely be perceived as fair based on
the U1 and US faculty governance systems provides an initial understanding with which
we can draw comparisons. The discussion of faculty perception of their power over
choosing new faculty and promotion decisions furthers this understanding for US based
institutions. Chapter II will integrate the known differences in these systems crossculturally with the stream of literature dealing with the cultural factors that influence
justice perceptions in order to build hypotheses.
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CHAPTER II
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
As noted previously, much of the initial organizational justice research was
conducted in Western, and mainly US contexts (Greenberg, 2001). Perhaps this stemmed
from the fact that initial tests of novel justice theories seemed to demonstrate that justice
perceptions and antecedents did not vary by culture. That is, in some of the more
paramount works in the area of procedural justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975), it has been
found that processes that provide for more voice are deemed more fair than those
processes that do not and these findings seem to hold regardless of country (Lind,
Erickson, Friedland, & Dickenberger, 1978; Lind, Tyler, & Huo, 1997). Taken with the
above discussion regarding the standardization of the academic profession in the US that
the AAUP guidelines provide, it is possible that there are certain core values of the
academic profession that make it less likely that there is variation in justice perceptions
cross-culturally.
However, there has also been an extensive amount of evidence that suggests
culture plays a role in shaping justice perceptions (Leung, 2005; Li & Cropanzano, 2009).
One of the conceptualizations used to understand the cross-cultural differences in justice
perceptions is through Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1980a; Hofstede &
Bond, 1988; Hofstede et al., 2010). Thus, it seems that there may be times in which there
are universal definitions of fairness (not culturally dependent) and other times in which
culture does shape fairness perceptions.
This chapter will provide the theoretical development for hypotheses looking at
the relationship between justice perceptions, faculty governance, and cultural values.
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Furthermore, hypotheses concerning the possible interactive effects of cultural values on
justice perceptions will be presented. However, before I begin theorizing, I would be
remiss if I did not provide a brief discussion of why the Hofstede cultural value
dimensions were chosen over other conceptualizations of culture as well as an overview
of the meaning of each of these dimensions.

Why Hofstede?
There are a number of conceptualizations of culture (Hofstede, 1980a; House,
Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004; Schwartz, 1994) and how individuals behave
within different cultures so it is important to understand why I am choosing Hofstede’s
dimensions. Although Hofstede’s (1980a) dimensions have been criticized as reducing
culture in an overly simplistic manner, it is due to this parsimony that many researchers
have gravitated towards it (Kirkman et al., 2006). This is evidenced by the fact that it has
been frequently cited (Hofstede, 2001) and has become the dominant cultural paradigm
of cross-cultural research (Sivakumar & Nakata, 2001). The Hofstede (1980a, 2001)
cultural dimensions have also been called one of the most influential cultural value
conceptualizations (Kirkman et al., 2006).
Furthermore, within organizational justice research specifically, Hofstede’s
cultural dimensions, particularly the Individualism-Collectivism and Power Distance
dimensions, have provided useful guideposts for understanding cross-cultural differences
in justice perceptions (Leung, 2005). In fact, recognizing the usefulness of Hofstede’s
dimensions in our attempts to further understand these differences, Shao et al. (2013)
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have challenged cross-cultural justice researchers to hypothesize on the manner in which
these dimension interact to predict cross-cultural differences in justice perceptions.7

The Cultural Dimensions
Individualism is characterized as looking out for one’s own best interests whereas
collectivism is characterized as having more of a focus on the larger community
(Hofstede, 1980b). Specifically, collectivists are characterized as having an identity based
on the “social system” and absolute loyalty is given to the in-group in exchange for the
security that is provided the individual by that group. On the other hand, individualists
find their identity within themselves and membership in wider groups is “calculative”.
The individualism-collectivism dimension is one of, if not the most, individuallevel and cultural-level value dimension used in cultural research (Earley & Gibson,
1998). The concepts of individualism and collectivism have often been studied in
conjunction with equity, equality and need based reward allocation decisions (Deutsch,
1975) and have been used to describe differences in reward allocation preferences in
cross-cultural research (C. C. Chen, 1995; Giacobbe-Miller et al., 2003).
Hofstede (1980b) refers to power distance as the extent to which power and status
differences in society are accepted. Low power distance relates to values such as equality
for all and accessible superiors in the work place. On the other hand, high power distance
is the belief that those in power have special privileges and that this is part of a natural

It should be noted here that Hofstede’s dimensions (1980a) describe culture at the
national level and are variables that represent an aggregate of the individuals within that
country. He notes that this does not mean that every individual within a country will hold
exactly the same values. That is, there are variations in cultural values at the individual
level. For a complete discussion of the dangers of using cultural value scores at the
individual level see Journal of International Business Studies, 2006, (37) 6, pg. 881-931.
7
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order. This definition seems to indicate that those high in power distance would not
expect to have input into procedures and that they would defer to the decision of an
authority figure.
Uncertainty avoidance is defined as the extent to which uncertain and ambiguous
situations are tolerated (Hofstede, 1980b). Those high in uncertainty avoidance tend to
value hard work, avoid conflict and prefer written rules and regulations.
Hofstede (1980b) states that masculinity encompasses the idea that sex roles are
strictly divided with men expected to be more assertive and women expected to be more
nurturing. The masculine orientation also emphasizes domination, performance and
obtaining financial and material goods. By contrast, in feminine cultures, sex roles are
more “fluid” as both men and women can be nurturing. Furthermore, feminine values
emphasize quality of life (what one might consider having a work-life balance), as well
as considering people, environment and society as a whole.
Confucian Dynamism or Long-term orientation refers to future-oriented values
such as persistence and thrift (The Chinese Culture Connection, 1987; Hofstede & Bond,
1988). Although this dimension was added to Hofstede’s original four more than twentyfive years ago, it has not been widely used in studies of cross-cultural justice. In fact, I
have been unable to obtain a single reference in which justice and long-term orientation
are mentioned in the same article. The meaning was also recently expanded beyond the
time orientation of a society to include a pragmatic versus normative association
(Hofstede, 2014b; Hofstede et al., 2010). Having a normative orientation is defined as
having a desire to explain as much as possible in order to establish absolute truth
(Hofstede, 2014b). Hofstede (2014b) also suggests that this dimension results in a respect
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for social conventions and traditions and having little interest in saving for the future.
Pragmatic cultures on the other hand believe it is impossible to fully understand the
complexities of life and that the context is an important aspect of understanding.
Pragmatic societies also value saving and investing for the future (Hofstede, 2014b).
The final dimension that is also a recent addition to Hofstede’s original cultural
values is that of restraint versus indulgence (Hofstede et al., 2010). Restraint refers to a
society that limits gratification of needs through strict social norms (Hofstede et al.,
2010). Indulgent societies on the other hand allow for free gratification of needs that
relate to enjoying life and having fun (Hofstede et al., 2010).

Justice and Faculty Governance
Distributive Justice and Academic Freedom
One of the fundamental findings that gave rise to interest in justice concepts was
the idea of relative deprivation (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams Jr.,
1949). In a study involving military personnel, Stouffer et al. (1949) found that despite
the fact that members of the Army Air Corps had a higher rate of advancement
opportunities than their Military Police counterparts, the Military Police reported being
more satisfied with advancement opportunities. It was found that the reason for this
unexpected finding came from the group with which those surveyed were comparing
themselves. The Military Police were not comparing themselves to their Air Corps
counterparts who seemingly had a better chance at promotion but were instead comparing
themselves to members of their training class. Thus, when promotion was achieved the
Military Police felt special as they had achieved something that relatively few in their
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referent group had. This not only speaks to the focus on rewards, but also to the
importance of a comparison or “referent other”.
This initial finding was succeeded by theorizing that distributive justice was the
relative reward versus cost in an exchange relationship (Homans, 1961). That is, fairness
exists when each party in an exchange relationship receives outcomes that are
proportional to their investments/costs (Homans, 1961). Alternatively, distributive
injustice exists when one is either under- or over- compensated for their inputs.
Expanding on these ideas Adams (1965), introduced Equity Theory which became the
dominant paradigm in justice research for the better part of two decades (Colquitt et al.,
2005). Equity theory posits the idea of weighing the ratio of one’s inputs to outcomes
versus some referent other. Going beyond Homans’ (1961) conceptualization of
distributive justice and following cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1962), Adams
(1965) suggested that when there is an imbalance of the input/outcome ratio, individuals
will work to restore this balance.
These theories gave way to a robust stream of research in which it was theorized
that equity is not the only allocation norm that is seen as fair [e.g. equality and need
(Leventhal, 1976)] and that the fairness of a given allocation rule is contextually
dependent (Deutsch, 1975). Specifically, it has been suggested that when promoting
productivity, rewards based on equity are the most fair, when promoting group harmony,
equality based reward allocation is the most fair and when promoting personal
development, need based reward allocation is the most fair (Deutsch, 1975). Evidence of
these reward allocation norms has been shown in Western contexts (Greenberg, 1978a,
1978b; Greenberg & Leventhal, 1976; Leventhal, Michaels, & Sanford, 1972).

28

Demonstrating the importance of distributive justice within workplace settings, research
has also found that there is a strong relationship between distributive justice and various
workplace outcomes such as outcome satisfaction, job satisfaction, organizational
commitment, trust, evaluation of authority and withdrawal (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson,
Porter, & Ng, 2001).
In the case of faculty governance, the AAUP outlines precisely when a promotion
is to be given (in this case tenure is to be granted or denied after seven years) which
directly relates to an outcome (American Association of University Professors, 1940).
However, the AAUP guidelines also explicitly state that the goal of higher education is
for the common good and depends on the free search for truth and that academic freedom
and tenure are essential for those ends (American Association of University Professors,
1940). Thus, there is nothing in the AAUP guidelines that suggest any contextual factors
that would lead to the preference for one allocation norm over another. These sentiments
also appear in the UNESCO guidelines as they state that higher education should exist for
the purposes of human development and the betterment of society and that academic
freedom and tenure (or its functional equivalent) are important aspects of those goals
(UNESCO, 1997). Given the international reach of UNESCO, it would seem to indicate
that the idea of academic freedom represents a core value of universities and their faculty
members regardless of which country the university or faculty member is working in. In
essence, academic freedom might be so important to the profession that it is a universal
standard.
Despite the seeming universal importance of academic freedom as discussed in
the UNESCO/AAUP guidelines and outlined above, there are stark differences in the
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extent that academic freedom exists at universities throughout the world. Therefore, in
order to develop hypotheses, it is prudent to include a discussion explicating these known
differences. This begins with a comprehensive discussion of faculty governance, in which
Altbach (2001) discusses the extent to which various countries and areas of the world
allow faculty members academic freedom. It is suggested that Latin American countries
have a history of holding academic freedom as sacred (Altbach, 2001). This resulted in
universities going as far as not allowing members of the government on campus without
an invitation. As might be expected, this separation of academe and state was eroded
under many of the dictatorships that have existed in various Latin American countries.
Although specific examples of countries are not provided, Altbach (2001) maintains that
once democracy returns to Latin American countries, the practice of maintaining
academic freedom will be quick to return as well. Furthermore, Altbach (2001) points out
that it seems where colonization occurs, so does a reduction in the existence of academic
freedom. As academic institutions tend to be drivers of civil unrest (Altbach, 2001),
colonial powers maintained tight control over universities and therefore the idea of
academic freedom was often repressed.
Given variations in cultural attributes that neighboring countries can have8 it is
difficult to make generalizations about how all of the faculty working in individual Latin
American countries view faculty governance. Therefore, where possible, I try to focus the
remainder of the discussion on specific countries.
8

As an example, the US and Mexico vary greatly on four of the six dimensions with
respective scores of 40 and 81 for power distance, 30 and 91 for individualism, 62 and 69
for masculinity, 46 and 82 for uncertainty avoidance, 26 and 24 for pragmatism, and 68
and 97 for indulgence. Thus, even though these countries are neighbors, the scores place
the US and Mexico in opposing categories for power distance, individualism, and
uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 2014a).
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In Argentina there is a “test” or “control” mechanism that makes all academic
appointments fixed-term (of 6-7 years) at the end of which results in a re-post of the
position and subsequent search (Bennion & Locke, 2010; Lamarra, Marquina, & Rebello,
2011). Although this suggests limits to academic freedom in that faculty can be replaced
after the term has ended, it seems that during the employment term they enjoy
considerable freedom in that they can only be removed in “extreme circumstances”
(Lamarra et al., 2011).
Perhaps mirroring the above assertion that Latin American countries value
academic freedom, seventy-six percent of the Mexican CAP respondents reported that
they felt the administration supported academic freedom (Galaz-Fontes et al., 2011)
which was the highest percentage of any of the countries in the survey (Postiglione &
Shiru, 2011). Although Mexican faculty do not report as much power in faculty related
personnel decisions as do their US counterparts, they do seem to enjoy academic
freedom.
Moving to countries in which academic freedom seems to be limited, an extreme
example comes from Burma (now known as Myanmar). In an effort to reduce student
protests and critiques of the Burmese government by faculty, the government of Burma
actually closed the universities (Altbach, 2001). One question this presents is what would
a fair faculty governance system look like to the jobless faculty of Burma?
China, Cuba and Vietnam also have significant limitations on academic freedom,
especially during crises [e.g. Tiananmen Square (Altbach, 2001)]. Given that current
examples of communist governments exercise strict control over their populations, it is
not surprising that as China, Cuba and Vietnam are communist states they exhibit similar
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characteristics in terms of faculty governance. For instance many in the social science
discipline are not allowed to be involved in activities that are deemed to go against the
wishes of the ruling regime such as challenging decisions of those regimes (Altbach,
2001). Engaging in this type of behavior can lead to anything from loss of appointment to
imprisonment. Islamic countries are another example of countries that severely limit
academic freedom (Altbach, 2001). This may be the result of an absence of democracy,
political instability, or intellectual struggles between fundamentalists and secular forces.
The lack of a tradition of academic freedom and institutional autonomy in these cases
make academics particularly susceptible to outside influence (Altbach, 2001).
Although China was surveyed as a part of the CAP survey, a chapter dedicated to
this country is not included in the book. However, there is a chapter for Hong Kong that
includes some discussion of the faculty responses from Mainland China. Although hard
numbers were not published, Mainland Chinese faculty report the least amount of power
over policy compared to their counterparts in the other seventeen countries (Postiglione
& Shiru, 2011). Echoing the above discussion regarding faculty control, Mainland
Chinese faculty also report a high degree of government power over policy compared to
their peers in the other countries (Postiglione & Shiru, 2011). Interestingly, even with the
lack of perceived power, Mainland Chinese faculty report having academic freedom at an
average rate compared to their counterparts in the other seventeen countries of the CAP
survey (Postiglione & Shiru, 2011). It is possible that this is attributable to Mainland
Chinese faculty having a similar level of academic freedom as compared to faculty
outside of China. However, it has also been suggested that justice perceptions are a result
of the norms and expectations that evolve from our situations (Rawls, 1999). In this case,
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Mainland Chinese faculty reporting similar access to academic freedom as their peers in
other countries may actually be the result of having lower expectations of academic
freedom, not because they are able to research and teach as they please.
In one of China’s neighboring countries, a majority of Japanese faculty strongly
agree or agree that the university administration supports academic freedom (Arimoto,
2011). This suggests that Japanese faculty enjoy similar academic freedom as their US
counterparts and that they might see a faculty governance system in line with
UNESCO/AAUP standards as fair.
Another area where academic freedom seems to be limited compared to Western
counterparts is in some smaller African countries and Cambodia. These countries have
academic freedom in the classroom and for non-politically or ideologically sensitive
areas, but are restricted from researching and teaching in politically and ideologically
sensitive areas (Altbach, 2001). In Malaysia and Singapore there are bans on some
research topics such as ethnic conflicts, some religious views, and local corruption
(Altbach, 2001). Thus it seems that there are limits here on academic freedom. Results of
the CAP survey conducted in Malaysia shows that faculty there are in the lower half of
the countries in terms of academic freedom and that there is a large governmental
influence over staff appointments as a result of the Universities and University Colleges
Act of 1971 (Azman, Jantan, & Sirat, 2011).
In terms of faculties’ perceptions of administration support of academic freedom,
South African faculty reported one of the lowest scores on this dimension compared to
the other seventeen countries in the CAP survey (Postiglione & Shiru, 2011). This might
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suggest that South African faculty would see a system giving them more power and more
academic freedom as fairer than their own.
There is also a group of countries that seem to have academic freedom but the
manner in which tenure (or its equivalent) is achieved is ambiguous. The first example of
this is in Hong Kong, where there is a relatively high percentage of fixed-term employees
even though tenure (or its equivalent) is somewhat available (Bennion & Locke, 2010).
The reason for the high percentage of fixed-term non-tenure track faculty in Hong Kong
seems to be the result of stiff competition for tenured positions (Bennion & Locke, 2010).
As a whole, although actual numbers are not reported, Hong Kong faculty appear to be in
the middle of the eighteen CAP countries in terms of how much power they have over
policy issues and how much influence is exerted by the government (Postiglione & Shiru,
2011). However, the majority of the power appears to rest with the school administration
(Postiglione & Shiru, 2011). Supporting the claim that Hong Kong faculty have academic
freedom, about fifty percent of respondents strongly agreed or agreed that the
administration supported academic freedom with another thirty percent being neutral
(Postiglione & Shiru, 2011).
Germany also has a high percentage of faculty in junior positions that are fixedterm but contain uncertainty as there is no time frame for when the possibility of tenure
(or its equivalent) is obtainable (Bennion & Locke, 2010). In terms of faculty
governance, German faculty did indicate that faculty committees have the most authority
over choosing new faculty and making promotion decisions and they feel they have
control over their own research agendas indicating a degree of academic freedom
(Teichler, 2011). However, they are also in the bottom of the eighteen CAP countries in
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terms of feeling that the administration supports academic freedom (Postiglione & Shiru,
2011).
The European Union is an example of an area of the world that has a wide range
of protections for academic freedom and institutional governance.9 Most of the EU
member countries have specific language in their national constitution or legislation at
the national government level that addresses both academic freedom and governance
(Karran, 2007).
In the United Kingdom (UK) there is legislative protection of academic freedom
but no tenure (faculty can be fired for performance reasons even if they have
“permanent” posts) or faculty power in institutional governance (Karran, 2007). The case
of the UK is interesting because up until 1988 faculty there enjoyed tenure similar to
what currently exists in the US. That is, after a probationary period and pending a tenure
review by fellow faculty members, academics were granted tenure that ensured
permanent employment except for just-cause dismissal. However, the 1988 Education
Reform Act although still protecting academic freedom removed the possibility of
obtaining tenure. This law also seemed to remove any self-governance that the faculty
had previously enjoyed as now there was a significant influence of lawmakers in
institutional governance. Interestingly, faculty respondents from the UK still report that
individual faculty and faculty committees have the majority of the power in choosing
new faculty and making promotion decisions (Locke & Bennion, 2011). However, they
also feel that there is a top-down management style and little collegiality in decision
making processes and this feeling has increased since the 1992 survey (Locke &
9

The term institutional governance here refers to the manner in which decision making
authority over the whole university exists.
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Bennion, 2011). They are also in the bottom of the eighteen CAP countries in terms of
feeling that the administration supports academic freedom (Postiglione & Shiru, 2011).
Based on these results and given the relative recent change from having tenure to not
having it, it might be safe to say that faculty in the UK would see a faculty governance
system in which tenure or its equivalent exists as more fair than their own.
In comparison to the UK, Finland, Hungary, Slovenia, Spain and the Czech
Republic have very specific national laws that guarantee academic freedom and power to
the faculty in terms of institutional governance (Karran, 2007). The language used in this
legislation ensures that the institutional governance it affords is free from outside
influence essentially creating a form of faculty self-governance (Karran, 2007). Thus, it
seems at least in the case of the countries with both academic freedom and selfgovernance protection that they would find the UNESCO/AAUP guidelines as fair.
The above discussion particularly surrounding Germany, Hong Kong, Malaysia,
and the UK does seem to suggest that when faculty feel they have little power in
governance, this erodes feelings that they have academic freedom. This suggests that
feelings about academic freedom seem to be universally held by members of the
profession.
Therefore, despite warnings against generalizing Western justice theories crossculturally (Leung, 2005), it seems that in the case of faculty governance there is no
evidence that the goal of ensuring academic freedom invites cross-cultural differences.
However, as outlined above, there is considerable variation in the amount of academic
freedom afforded university faculty around the world. As ensuring academic freedom is
the goal of both UNESCO and AAUP standards, the focus of distributive justice in this
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context is simply on the fairness of academic freedom at the organizational level. This
leads to the following universal hypothesis,
Hypothesis 1a (universal): Institutional policies and practices that comply with
UNESCO/AAUP guidelines in assuring academic freedom for faculty will be
seen as more distributively fair than those that do not comply. These perceptions
will not vary by country.

However, there are also instances in which faculty working at universities
following UNESCO/AAUP guidelines report lower perceptions of academic freedom
than their counterparts in other countries. Indeed, in the case of Finland, faculty
respondents feel as though they and faculty committees have authority over faculty
personnel selection and promotion (Aarrevaara, Dobson, & Pekkola, 2011). However,
Finnish faculty respondents to the CAP survey reported the lowest perception that their
administrations supported academic freedom (Postiglione & Shiru, 2011). The case of
Finland actually offers an interesting natural experiment as to why they, despite having
power in faculty personnel decisions, feel as though they do not have academic freedom.
Specifically, a US style tenure system was implemented at Aalto University in Finland.
Rules outlining the governance of this system note that a Departmental Tenure Track
Committee makes decisions regarding a candidate’s qualifications indicating that it
provides a similar amount of control to faculty as provided by UNESCO/AAUP
standards (Aalto University, 2014). However, faculty were skeptical of what the system
actually meant in terms of academic freedom with the concern being that it would force
them to narrow their research focus and limit their ability to engage in interdisciplinary
research (Herbert & Tienari, 2013). These fears stemmed from the observation that US
style tenure-track systems did not reward interdisciplinary research but instead required
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scholars to publish in top-tier journals in specific fields (Karran, 2007). Thus, the faculty
at Aalto University was afraid the new system would benefit a few “elite” scholars. On
the other hand, the strategists (those implementing the system) thought that the US style
tenure system would ensure high quality research and provide a clear understanding of
what is required to obtain tenure and job security which, in their eyes, would increase
fairness (Herbert & Tienari, 2013). This change in governance structure may suggest that
the Finnish faculty feel their rights are being eroded away and hence their low beliefs
about their academic freedom. This also further demonstrates the dangers of importing
human resource practices (Aycan, 2005; Hempel, 2001; Lunnan et al., 2005) that are
deemed fair in one country and expecting them to be deemed fair in another. It also
suggests the apparent differences in perceptions of fairness of similar faculty governance
systems that can exist cross-culturally.
With roots stemming from Germany, the UK, and the US, Canada seems to have
academic freedom and tenure that is similar to the US but with more self-governance than
what generally exists within the US (Monahan, 1983). As an example, the Governor of
the State appoints the majority of the Board of Trustees at U1 (Union, 2012) and fellow
board members vote on who to include in the Board of Trustees at U2 (U2, 2014). This
effectively removes some of the decision-making authority from the faculty and places it
in the hands of a third party. However, Canadian institutions of higher education have
more self-management by faculty as their faculty senate seems to have more authority
than US faculty senates. Specifically, Canadian university faculty senates have power not
only over issues of academic freedom but also over university governance (Monahan,
1983). This is perhaps fueled by the fact that there is no standard overall governance
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structure in Canada as the individual territories and provinces have unique governance
structures (Metcalfe et al., 2011). Instead, the Association of Universities and Colleges of
Canada (AUCC) acts as a non-governmental overseer of Canadian universities (Metcalfe
et al., 2011). Similar to the AAUP in the US, the AUCC in Canada has no formal
authority but unlike the AAUP it acts as a de facto Canadian university accrediting body
(Metcalfe et al., 2011). Suggesting the greater authority that faculty may have over
faculty governance in Canada, a greater percentage of Canadian faculty report that
faculty bodies have the authority in new faculty selection and promotion decisions
compared to their US counterparts (Metcalfe et al., 2011). This would suggest that
Canadian academics might see the faculty governance that exists in the US, particularly
at U2 in which the President of the university (as appointed by the Board of Trustees,
thus a third party to the faculty) has final decision making over hiring, promotion and
tenure of faculty, as less fair than their own system.
Finally, much like the country itself, Australian universities seem to operate under
a system that puts them on a metaphorical island. That is, universities fit into three
categories with one being heavily research oriented and the other two being labeled the
“rest” with some research and teaching focus or just teaching focus (Coates, Dobson,
Goedegebuure, & Meek, 2011). In the case of the research intensive universities, the
power for personnel selection and promotion decisions rests with faculty committees, and
with the other institutions it rests more heavily with institutional authorities and
department heads (Coates et al., 2011). One could assume that as the faculty at the
research intensive universities report having a similar amount of power as their Western
counterparts, that a UNESCO/AAUP faculty governance system would be seen as the
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most fair but this does beg the question of how the other university faculty might view
the fairness of such a system.
Taken together, the discussion of Australian, Canadian, and Finnish faculty seems
to indicate cross-cultural differences in the effect of UNESCO/AAUP policies and
practices on academic freedom perceptions and leads to the following competing, culturespecific hypothesis,
Hypothesis 1b (cultural effects): Institutional policies and practices that comply
with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines in assuring academic freedom for faculty will
not be seen as more distributively fair than those that do not comply. These
perceptions will vary by country.

Additionally, in describing faculty governance above, it was pointed out that there
are some countries that have a high rate of fixed-term contracts (e.g. Argentina) or
instances in which junior faculty spend extended periods of time in uncertainty regarding
their job status (e.g. Germany). This uncertainty would seem to run counter to
UNESCO/AAUP guidelines regarding the importance of establishing academic freedom
in that without tenure (or its functional equivalent) academics could experience reduced
academic freedom. Indeed, the CAP survey points to a wide variation of faculty feelings
regarding how much their administration supports academic freedom (Postiglione &
Shiru, 2011). Thus, faculty who face uncertainty in their job status may experience in
practice or perception reduced academic freedom. Fortunately, the uncertainty
management model may help to explicate this issue. The uncertainty management model
linking fairness and uncertainty has been proposed in the social psychology literature.
Specifically, Lind and van den Bos, (2002) and van den Bos and Lind (2002) proposed
that the uncertainty management model linked these two constructs by showing that the
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process of justice judgments is initiated in times of uncertainty and that justice is then
used to manage uncertainty. This model took existing research showing that fairness is a
crucial aspect of influencing stakeholder attitudes like job satisfaction, organizational
commitment and intentions to stay with the organization (Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, &
Taylor, 2000; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992; Tyler & Blader, 2000) and demonstrated that
the degree to which fairness affects these variables is largely dependent upon the amount
of uncertainty the individual faces.
What the uncertainty management model suggests is that fairness helps to manage
uncertainty because it reassures stakeholders that they can expect fair outcomes and
reduces their concern that they will be exploited. Accordingly, those higher in uncertainty
avoidance would expect fairness and would react more negatively to the absence of
fairness compared to those lower in uncertainty avoidance. In fact, Lind and van den Bos
(2002 pg. 205) state, "In general, where cultural or situational factors increase the
salience of uncertainty, we expect to see stronger fairness effects.” This suggests that
some cultures might be more sensitive to uncertainty, thus there would be stronger justice
effects.
The uncertainty management model was tested in cross-cultural contexts and it
was found that justice effects are stronger among employees from countries that are high
in Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance dimension (Shao et al., 2013). Consistent with this
view, other research at an individual (not cross-cultural level) has found that individuals
high in uncertainty avoidance in Canada preferred equitable distribution of rewards more
strongly than their fellow citizens who were lower in uncertainty avoidance (Otto,
Baumert, & Bobocel, 2011). Furthermore, in a cross-cultural analysis, Otto et al. (2011)
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found that Germans viewed the equitable distribution of material rewards as less fair than
their Canadian counterparts but there was no difference in the German sample between
those low in uncertainty avoidance and those high in uncertainty avoidance. As equitable
reward distribution is the norm in individualistic nations such as Canada (Kim, Park, &
Suzuki, 1990), it is not surprising that Canadians high in uncertainty avoidance would
indicate that they found the equitable distribution of rewards the most fair compared to
their low uncertainty avoidance Canadian and German counterparts. Although Germany
is more collectivistic than Canada, with a score of 67 (compared to 80 for Canada)
(Hofstede, 1980a) it can by no means be considered overly collectivistic. However, the
Otto et al. (2011) study also showed that Germans found the equal distribution of rewards
as fairer than their Canadian counterparts and that this effect was greater for those
Germans high in uncertainty avoidance compared to those low in uncertainty avoidance.
What this indicates is that those high in uncertainty avoidance will adhere more strictly to
reward allocation norms dictated by their respective countries. Therefore, if reward
allocation falls outside of cultural norms such as the case with long periods of uncertainty
in the rewarding of permanent positions to German academics, this will be seen as less
fair for those high in uncertainty avoidance compared to those low uncertainty avoidance.
Taken together this leads to the following hypothesis regarding the moderating effect of
the cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance,
Hypothesis 1c (cultural effects): The relationship between institutional policies
and practices to distributive justice perceptions will be moderated by the cultural
dimension of uncertainty avoidance. Institutional policies and practices that do
not provide guidelines ensuring academic freedom will be seen as more unfair by
individuals from high uncertainty avoidance countries compared to individuals
from low uncertainty avoidance countries.
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Procedural Justice
There are two seminal works that expanded the focus of organizational justice
research from simply input/outcome ratios as the predictor of fairness to also include the
process used to arrive at those outcomes. The first was Thibaut and Walker (1975) who
found that it was not the outcomes alone that mattered but also the procedures and the
amount of control (or voice) individuals have over those procedures. Specifically, in a
series of experiments involving law students, the adversarial legal system (a system that
provides control over the presentation of evidence to the parties involved) and
inquisitorial legal system (a system in which a judge controls the presentation of
evidence) were compared. This research determined that the adversarial system was
deemed more fair than the inquisitorial system because the adversarial system allowed
participants more control over the process (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Interestingly, this
demonstrated the distinction between concerns of distributive fairness and procedural
fairness as in both legal systems the outcomes were controlled by a third party
(Greenberg, 2011).
Bringing this finding into the organizational context in which control over
processes and decisions often rests with managers (conceptually similar to a judge in the
legal context) this finding caused Leventhal (1980) to posit six principles that are
important in shaping the perceptions of fair process in the context of third-party decision
making. The first principle is consistency, which states that procedures should be applied
consistently across time and all parties involved, the second is that procedures should be
free from bias, the third is that procedures should be based on accurate information, the
fourth is that procedures should be correctable in the instance of a grievance, the fifth
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principle is that of representativeness, which states that procedures should reflect basic
concerns, values and outlooks of individuals affected by them, and the last principle is
that procedures should keep with ethical and moral concerns of individuals involved in
them. Subsequent research has found the concept of process control (Thibaut & Walker,
1975) and the procedural justice rules (Leventhal, 1980) are important in performance
evaluations and compensation decisions (Folger & Greenberg, 1985). Finally, within
organizational contexts it has been shown that an aspect of control, voice in procedures,
is an important factor in maintaining procedural fairness (Greenberg & Folger, 1983).
Possibly stemming from the original Thibaut and Walker (1975) procedural
justice tests, much of the cross-cultural research in this area investigates conflict
resolution processes. Initial findings suggested that the idea of process control or voice in
procedures is an important antecedent of procedural justice judgments. For instance, Lind
et al. (1978) found that the adversarial system was preferred not only by US participants
(whose legal system is based on this model), but also by respondents from the UK, West
Germany and France. As the adversarial legal system allows for participant control, these
findings seem to suggest that process control is seen as the most fair no matter the
cultural context. Some years later in investigating the antecedents of procedural justice, it
was found that the relational variables that are considered in procedural justice judgments
seemed to be defined much the same way across samples of students from the US,
Germany, Hong Kong, and Japan (Lind et al., 1997). This provides further indication that
procedures that provide process control and that are based on accurate information will
be judged as fair across cultures.
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Within the research discussing the amount of control that faculty have over
governance in non-Western contexts there appears to be much variance. This ranges from
systems in which faculty or faculty committees retain the power as is the case at U1 to
systems in which departmental or institutional authorities hold this power. For instance, it
has been stated that in African countries the academic profession as a whole has less
power than it does in the West (Herbert & Tienari, 2013; Teferra & Altbach, 2004).
Within many African cultures, the chancellors and vice-chancellors make hiring
decisions without faculty input (Teferra & Altbach, 2004). In essence, the new faculty
member will one day show up and be introduced as a new colleague! Indeed, it was
found that in answering the questions of which actor has the primary influence over
choosing new academic staff and making promotion decisions, South African faculty
were more likely to indicate institutional authorities over external stakeholders, academic
unit managers, faculty committees, or individual faculty (Wolhuter, Higgs, Higgs, &
Ntshoe, 2011). Thus, it seems that at least from a faculty perspective, institutional
authorities have the power over these decisions. This also appears to be the case in
Malaysia as in terms of choosing new faculty and making promotion decisions,
Malaysian CAP survey respondents report that institutional managers and academic unit
managers have the most power with faculty committees and individual faculty having
very little influence (Azman et al., 2011).
Faculty committees seem to have influence over hiring decisions in Argentina.
However, of the faculty respondents to the CAP survey, academic unit managers were
cited more often as the primary influencers over choosing new faculty and in making
promotion decisions (Lamarra et al., 2011). Although faculty in Argentina seem to have
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more power in faculty hiring and promotion decisions than their Malaysian and South
African counterparts, it still seems that they are not the primary decision makers.
Given Portugal’s past relationship with Brazil, it may fit with the assertion
mentioned above that countries which were heavily colonized face academic freedom
issues. Particularly, Brazil has seen periods of expanded private education (Balbachevsky
& Schwartzman, 2011) that has created two seemingly contrary methods of faculty
governance, one for the public sector and one for the private sector. Institutional
authorities are seen as having the primary authority over decisions; however, for public
research universities the difference between institutional authorities and faculty in
decision making is far less than in private institutions with the latter rarely indicating they
had any authority whatsoever (Balbachevsky & Schwartzman, 2011). It was indicated
that faculty committees do have authority over choosing new hires and promotion
decisions within the public research universities but academic unit managers have this
authority in private institutions (Balbachevsky & Schwartzman, 2011). Given the
importance of process control in justice perceptions (Thibaut & Walker, 1975) it would
not be surprising to see faculty members from public institutions in Brazil report higher
perceptions of justice than their counterparts from private institutions. With this, we also
see within-country variance in the types of faculty governance that exists at universities
but the fact that faculty at private institutions indicate that they have virtually no power
suggests an even greater difference than their counterparts at U1 and U2 described above.
Japanese faculty report a great influence over faculty governance related matters.
Specifically, the vast majority of Japanese faculty feel as if they or faculty committees
have power over personnel selection and promotion decisions (Arimoto, 2011). This
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seems to suggest that Japanese faculty enjoy similar decision-making power as their US
counterparts suggesting that they might see a faculty governance system in line with
UNESCO/AAUP standards as fair.
In another Asian country, South Korean academics report having the vast majority
of the power in new faculty selection and the majority of the power in promotion
decisions (Shin, 2011). Although this does not speak to the possible perceived fairness of
a tenure system, this does seem in line with UNESCO/AAUP standards suggesting that
South Koreans would see this system as fair. This is not surprising given the roots of
South Korean universities in the US and German traditions (Shin, 2011).
Norwegian academics report that faculty and faculty committees have the
majority of the responsibility in hiring new faculty but institutional authorities have
control over promotions (Vabø, 2011). There also seems to be some concern regarding
the ability of the country to attract and retain top researchers as like the German system,
there are long periods of uncertainty before a permanent academic position can be
obtained and even after this there is no tenure system (Vabø, 2011). The fact that
academics are leaving Finland could be an indication of a lack of jobs or it could be an
indication that they do not see the Finish system as fair and thus they seek out an
employment relationship in a country that falls more in-line with their fairness concerns.
In the case of Hong Kong and Germany, the question becomes, do they see a
tenure system with a set probationary period as outlined by UNESCO/AAUP as fairer
than their own? Or, are there other aspects of the systems in place at institutions within
these two countries that account for the uncertainty or otherwise make clear the
expectations for promotion? In the case of Argentina, again the question is whether
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Argentineans are happy with the current system given that the expectations are clear to
everyone, or is there a sense that a tenure system like the one laid out by the AAUP
guidelines is perceived as fairer than theirs?
The UNESCO recommendations for institutions of higher education have many
aspects that are in-line with the initial conceptualizations as put forth by Thibaut and
Walker (1975) and Leventhal (1980). Specifically, UNESCO guidelines state that faculty
should have an active role in the governing bodies of higher education institutions and
should be involved in the appraisal of the work of fellow academics [process control and
voice (Greenberg & Folger, 1983)], that this assessment is based on valid criteria and is
objective (Leventhal’s rule of accuracy and representativeness), that this assessment be
free of bias, and that faculty should have the right to appeal decisions with which they
disagree (Leventhal’s rule of correctability) (UNESCO, 1997). As stated above, the
AAUP standards also state that faculty status and related matters are the primary
responsibility of the faculty (American Association of University Professors, 1966)
which falls in-line with the process control model (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). In the
examples of faculty governance within the countries mentioned above, there is variation
in the amount of control faculty report that they have. There also does seem to be some
indication (particularly in the case of Norway) that policies and practices that fall outside
of UNESCO/AAUP guidelines might be seen as less fair. Given what appears to be
cross-cultural support for similar conceptualizations of procedural justice it is expected
that, universally,
Hypothesis 2a (universal): Institutional policies (regarding hiring, tenure/
contract renewal, promotion, and performance appraisal) that comply with
UNESCO/AAUP guidelines regarding governance processes will be seen as more
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procedurally fair than those that do not comply. These perceptions will not vary
by county.

The general hypothesis presented above covers a range of aspects of the
employment relationship. However, there are many aspects of this relationship that could
be seen as fair or unfair including recruiting, hiring, promotion, tenure, and pay raises. As
an example, the CAP survey discussed above suggests that faculty feel they have varying
amounts of power over different aspects of this relationship. For instance, in some
countries faculty feel they have power over both the hiring of new faculty and promotion
decisions, in others they feel they have power over one or the other of these aspects and
still in others they feel they have power over neither. The question becomes “are there
variations in fairness perceptions based on different aspects of the employment
relationship?” In other words, do some people care more about power in promotion
decisions than they do over new faculty selection? As such, the test of this hypothesis
will involve examining control over many of the activities involved in faculty
governance.
Furthermore, even though there is no evidence to suggest cross-cultural
differences in fairness perceptions of institutional policies and practices that meet
UNESCO/AAUP standards, research into the effect of the individualism-collectivism
cultural value suggests that there might be moderating effects of cultural dimensions in
procedural justice judgments. Specifically, with conflict resolution proceedings it has
been found that collectivists (individuals from Hong Kong) were more apt to choose
mediation than their individualist (individuals from the US) counterparts even though
they felt this resulted in less process control (Leung, 1987; Morris, Leung, & Iyengar,
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2004). These studies suggest that at least on some level collectivists may be less
enamored with process control. This suggests a moderating hypothesis,
Hypothesis 2b (cultural effects): The relationship between institutional policies
(regarding hiring, tenure/ contract renewal, promotion, and performance
appraisal) and practices to procedural justice perceptions will be moderated by the
cultural dimension of individualism-collectivism. Institutional policies and
practices that leave decision control to a third party will be seen as more fair by
individuals from collectivistic countries than those from individualistic countries.

In terms of the impact of power distance on procedural fairness, it was found that
individuals from Japan and Korea were more likely to appeal to authorities to resolve
conflict (Chung & Lee, 1989). It was also found that an authority figure’s involvement in
a dispute was seen as more fair by those in a high power distance country (China)
compared to a low power distance country (Canada) (Tse, Francis, & Walls, 1994). This
makes theoretical sense given the expectation of status differences within high power
distance societies. Therefore, it would seem that decisions coming from authority figures
would be perceived as more fair by those high in power distance compared to those low
in power distance. Furthermore, it was found that people from low power distance
countries (Germany and the US) had lower organizational commitment after the denial of
voice than did their high power distance counterparts (China, Mexico and Hong Kong)
(Brockner et al., 2001).
Evidence from the CAP survey shows that in Mexico, it appears as though most
of the power for the selection of new faculty and promotion decisions rest with faculty,
faculty committees and institutional/academic unit managers (Galaz-Fontes et al., 2011).
However, as with Argentina and Brazil, the majority of this power appears to be on the
institutional/academic unit side as opposed to the faculty side (Galaz-Fontes et al., 2011).
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This is further evidenced by the fact that over fifty percent of Mexican respondents to the
CAP survey reported there being a top-down management style within their institution
(Galaz-Fontes et al., 2011). Yet in spite of this, eighty-seven percent of Mexican faculty
report being very highly or highly satisfied with their jobs (Locke, Cummings, & Fisher,
2011). Thus, even though Mexican faculty reports relatively low decision-making
involvement, they are still satisfied with their jobs.
Taken together, the above research suggests that in high power distance countries
faculty might not expect to be involved in hiring or promotion decisions (i.e. they would
be denied voice) and would not necessarily see it as less fair should those decisions be
made by a third party or authority figure. This seems to run counter to UNESCO/AAUP
standards that indicate decision making should be left to the faculty and suggests another
competing hypothesis,
Hypothesis 2c (cultural effects): The relationship between authoritarian
decision-making to procedural justice perceptions will be moderated by the
cultural dimension of power distance. Authoritarian decision-making will be seen
as more fair by those from high power distance countries compared to those from
low power distance countries.

There also seems to be a preference for more standardized processes, an aspect of
procedural justice, based on uncertainty avoidance. For instance, one study demonstrated
that in societies that were higher in uncertainty avoidance, there was a greater reliance on
formalized selection procedures in hiring decisions (Ryan, McFarland, Baron, & Page,
1999). This suggests that when uncertainty avoidance is high, there will be a greater
reliance on formalized rules to ensure procedural fairness. It was also shown that in
remediation for service failure, individuals indicating a preference for uncertainty
avoidance had higher perceptions of justice when they were kept informed of the
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remediation process compared to those indicating low uncertainty avoidance (Patterson,
Cowley, & Prasongsukarn, 2006). Furthermore, it has been shown that uncertainty in
markets can increase the importance of procedural justice on outcomes in joint alliances
(Luo, 2005). These studies indicate that as the preference for uncertainty avoidance
increases, individuals search for a means to reduce that uncertainty which often results in
reliance on, or at the very least, knowledge of the procedures used to arrive at outcomes.
This leads to another competing hypothesis that suggests cultural effects,
Hypothesis 2d (cultural effects): The relationship of institutional policies
(regarding hiring, tenure/ contract renewal, promotion, and performance
appraisal) that provide guidelines for governance processes to procedural justice
will be moderated by the cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance.
Institutional policies that provide guidelines for governance processes will be seen
as more fair by those from high uncertainty avoidance countries compared to
those from low uncertainty avoidance countries.

Interactional Justice
The final dimensions of organizational justice is collectively called interactional
justice. This is the term used to describe the relative interpersonal treatment received
during the enactment of procedures within organizational contexts (Bies & Moag, 1986).
Bies and Moag (1986) posited that there were four rules that govern interactional justice.
The first is truthfulness which refers to open communications when implementing
decision-making procedures, the second is justification which is the extent to which
adequate explanations are given for decisions made, the third is respect which is the
extent to which authorities treat individuals with dignity, and the fourth is propriety
which is that authorities refrain from making improper remarks in communication (e.g.
free from racial, gender, and/or religious undertones). The concept of interactional justice
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seemed to relate to procedural justice and in fact there was much overlap between these
constructs in early operationalizations [for a review see Colquitt et al. (2005)].
Further clarification of the concept of interactional justice led to the theorization
that there were actually two distinct aspects of this construct, one being informational
justice which refers to the truthfulness and justification rules and the other being
interpersonal justice which refers to the respect and propriety rules (Greenberg, 1993).
This results in the theoretical understanding that there are four dimensions of
organizational justice. Indeed, in his seminal work tapping the rules of all four forms of
justice, Colquitt (2001) found that the four factor model with the dimensions being
conceptually distinct was the best fit compared to models in which these dimensions were
grouped together.
With the exception of being free from punishment as the result of violations of
academic freedom and a mention that faculty are to be afforded collegiality in decisionmaking processes there is little guiding the relative treatment of faculty members by
institutional authorities (UNESCO, 1997). As interactional justice as a whole and
specifically interpersonal justice involves the treatment by a manager [e.g. (Greenberg,
2009; Scott, Colquitt, & Paddock, 2009)] and there is no theoretical reason that the
proposed research testing the relative fairness of faculty governance systems relates to
managerial interactions, there will be no hypotheses presented on the interpersonal
component of interactional justice. Along this vein, the truthfulness rule also relates to
the relative treatment by a manager, thus the focus will be on the justification rule of
informational justice. This makes theoretical sense as the UNESCO guidelines do state
that the results of any direct assessment of higher-education personnel should be made
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known to the individual that it concerns. In this case both UNESCO and AAUP
guidelines state that promotions are the responsibility of faculty, thus faculty become a de
facto authority figure and providing the results of appraisals in this situation becomes
justification for decisions regarding employment status. Thus, to the extent that the
UNESCO/AAUP guidelines reflect core values in the academy, one would expect the
following universal hypothesis,
Hypothesis 3a (universal): Institutional policies (regarding hiring and
promotion) that comply with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines regarding transparency
in employment decisions will be perceived as more informationally fair than those
policies that do not comply. These perceptions will not vary by county.

However, as with procedural justice, there does seem to be some evidence that
suggests there are differences in expectations of interactional justice based on power
distance. Specifically, the relationship between voice and overall perceptions of an
authority figure was moderated by power distance such that those low in power distance
focused on the manner in which they were treated whereas those high in power distance
focused on their outcomes (Tyler, Lind, & Huo, 2000). This seems to be in line with the
acceptance by those high in power distance of unequal distribution of power between
authority figures and subordinates and leads to the following competing hypothesis,
Hypothesis 3b (cultural effects): The relationship between transparency and
information fairness perceptions will be moderated by the cultural characteristic
of power distance. Institutional policies (regarding hiring and promotion) that do
not provide for transparency in employment decisions will be perceived as less
informationally fair by those from low power distance countries compared to
those from high power distance countries.
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Additional Cultural Value Main Effects
In the case of power distance, after some initial findings that seemed to suggest
that individuals high in power distance had a similar reaction to procedural injustice as
their low power distance counterparts (Lind et al., 1997), additional studies have shown
that there are indeed differences in fairness perceptions based on power distance. As
mentioned above, the relationship between voice and overall perceptions of an authority
figure was moderated by power distance such that those low in power distance focused
on the manner in which they were treated whereas those high in power distance focused
on their outcomes (Tyler et al., 2000). This relationship was also shown to hold when
work outcomes rather than perceptions of a third party were measured such that voice
was more salient for those low in power distance compared to those high in power
distance (Brockner et al., 2001). Furthering this finding, it has also been shown that
power distance moderates the impact of voice on procedural justice perceptions such that
those low in power distance report higher perceptions of procedural justice than their
high power distance counterparts (Breland et al., 2011). This finding suggests that power
distance may also act as an antecedent to procedural justice perceptions. As those high in
power distance expect there to be status differences in society providing those with
higher status special privileges (e.g. not involving lower status employees in procedures
used to arrive at rewards), they are likely to ignore any perceived voice (procedural
justice) injustice and focus on rewards. Thus,
Hypothesis 4 (cultural effects): Controlling for institutional policies and
practices, perceptions of procedural justice will be lower for individuals from low
power distance countries compared to those from high power distance countries.
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Cultural Value Interactive Effects
Some of the cross-cultural organizational research indicates the possibility that
there are interactive effects of the Hofstede (1980a) cultural dimensions. Specifically, it
seems that the idea of congruence in determining how cultural values interact is
important to consider. Congruence is the idea that there are aspects of cultural dimensions
that will lead individuals from a country that espouses that value to prefer a certain set of
norms or behave in a certain way. As an example, those from collectivistic societies
prefer harmony and will work to maintain it by avoiding direct confrontation (Hofstede et
al., 2010). When the workplace allows collectivists to avoid conflict, it is congruent with
their preferred behavioral patterns and may have positive outcomes for the organization.
However, when collectivists must engage in conflict it becomes non-congruent and may
have negative outcomes for the organization. An empirical study looking at management
practices and cultural values demonstrated how when management practices and cultural
values were in tune (congruent), work unit performance increased (Newman & Nollen,
1996). In this study, level of participation (low vs. high) in group decision making and
power distance (low vs. high) of work groups were compared based on performance. It
was hypothesized and found that work groups that had congruence (those low in
participation and high power distance and those high in participation and low in power
distance) would perform the best compared to their non-congruent (those high in
participation and high power distance and those low in participation and low in power
distance) counterparts (Newman & Nollen, 1996).
As outlined above, the relationship between voice and overall perceptions of an
authority figure was moderated by power distance such that those low in power distance
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focused on the manner in which they were treated whereas those high in power distance
focused on their outcomes (Tyler et al., 2000). This relationship was also shown to hold
when work outcomes rather than perceptions of a third party were measured such that
voice was more salient for those low in power distance compared to those high in power
distance (Brockner et al., 2001). This suggests that because individuals high in power
distance expect there to be status differences in society, they are likely to ignore any
perceived voice injustice and focus on rewards.
In the case of uncertainty avoidance, is was mentioned above that tests of the
uncertainty management model in a cross-cultural context found that uncertainty
avoidance was linked to reward allocation (distributive justice) preferences (Otto et al.,
2011). In this study those high in uncertainty avoidance held more strongly to cultural
norms regarding what was fair in reward allocation. In the current context it would seem
that faculty from high uncertainty avoidance countries would more strongly prefer reward
allocation in-line with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines. Furthermore, it seems that those high
in uncertainty avoidance rely more heavily on formalized rules compared to their low
uncertainty avoidance counterparts (Patterson et al., 2006; Ryan et al., 1999). These
findings demonstrate congruence between those high in power distance and those high in
uncertainty avoidance regarding adherence to reward allocation in-line with
UNESCO/AAUP guidelines. It also seems as if those from low power distance countries
are likely to focus more on the procedures used in arriving at rewards and there may be
congruence with those from high uncertainty avoidance countries who focus on rule
adherence. This leads to the last two hypotheses. As a reference, Figure 1 represents the
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expected pattern of the relationship in Hypothesis 5a, and Figure 2 represents the
expected pattern of the relationship in Hypothesis 5b.
Hypothesis 5a (interactive cultural effects): Perceptions of distributive justice
resulting from institutional policies that comply with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines
regarding academic freedom will be highest for individuals from countries that
are both high in power distance and high in uncertainty avoidance.

Perceptions of Distributive
Justice

Hypothesis 5b (interactive cultural effects): Perceptions of procedural justice
resulting from institutional policies that comply with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines
regarding governance process will be highest for individuals from countries that
are both low in power distance and high in uncertainty avoidance.

hi PD
lo PD

lo UA

hi UA

Perceptions of Procedural
Justice

Figure 1: Expected Pattern of Relationship in Hypothesis 5a

hi PD
lo PD

lo UA

hi UA

Figure 2: Expected Pattern of Relationship in Hypothesis 5b
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The Other Three Cultural Dimensions
To this point, discussions of the main effects of the Hofstede (1980a) cultural
dimensions within the faculty governance context has been limited to individualismcollectivism, power distance and uncertainty avoidance and has left out the dimensions of
masculinity-femininity, long- & short- term orientation, and indulgence-restraint. The
reason for this is that theory and research as to the impact of these three dimensions on
justice perceptions is unclear or sparse. if it exists at all. However, given that one of the
goals of the proposed research is to comprehensively explicate the relationship of cultural
values and justice perceptions, I would be remiss to leave these three dimensions out of
the discussion. At the same time, given the lack of evidence to support a theoretical
understanding of these dimensions on justice perceptions, this section is offered as
speculation with the expectation that there will be effects of these dimensions on justice
perceptions.

Masculinity-Femininity
Research into the effect of the masculinity-femininity dimension on justice
perceptions is sparse and what does exist provides little insight into the relationship
between these two variables. For instance, in one study it was predicted that
individualists (students from the US) would have a higher rate of equitable reward
allocation compared to their collectivistic counterparts (students from Japan). However, it
was found that these two samples did not differ significantly on the rate of equitable
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reward allocation (Kim et al., 1990). Although Kim et al. (1990) did not test for the
effects of masculinity-femininity on reward allocation preference, they suggest that the
non-statistically significant difference in equitable reward allocation between the two
samples was due to Japan’s strong masculine orientation as the focus is on material
acquisition. Therefore, someone identifying as masculine would seek equitable reward
allocation as they would get out what they put in and would be able to obtain more
material goods. However, equitable reward allocation was also found to be fair by the
South Korean sample characterized as both collectivistic and feminine pointing to a lack
of clarity as to the effects of the masculinity-femininity dimension.
In one of the few studies that did test for the effect of masculinity-femininity it
was found that in a sample from the US and China, masculinity was found to moderate
the effect of procedural justice on organizational citizenship behaviors (Schilpzand,
Martins, Kirkman, Lowe, & Chen, 2013). However, van den Bos et al. (2010) found that
individuals in the US (a masculine culture) thought that it was unfair to be denied voice
[one of the major factors of procedural justice (Greenberg & Folger, 1983; Lind & Tyler,
1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975)] when performance capabilities were high (participants
told they performed well on an experimental task) but did not see the denial of voice as
unfair when performance capabilities were low (participants told they performed poorly
on an experimental task). By contrast, their Dutch counterparts (a feminine culture) found
it unfair to be denied voice when performance capabilities were low and not unfair when
performance capabilities were high. As with reward allocation preference, it seems that in
determining the effects of the masculinity-femininity dimension on perceptions of justice,
context is an important factor. However, given that the UNESCO/AAUP standards do not
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mention performance capabilities, it would be difficult to predict the main effects of
masculinity-femininity on any of the justice dimensions in the faculty governance
context. As a result, the masculinity-femininity dimension will be examined on a strictly
exploratory basis.

Long-Term Orientation
Confucian dynamism or long-term orientation refers to future-oriented values
such as persistence and thrift (The Chinese Culture Connection, 1987; Hofstede & Bond,
1988). Although this dimension was added to Hofstede’s original four more than twentyfive years ago, it has not been widely used in studies of cross-cultural justice. In fact, I
have been unable to obtain a single reference in which justice and long-term orientation
are mentioned in the same article. In addition to the complications with accurately
theorizing about this dimension’s impact on justice perceptions due to the lack of
research and perhaps mirroring the fluid nature of culture itself (Appadurai, 1990;
Rosaldo, 1988) the meaning has been expanded to encompass more than simply the time
orientation of a society (Hofstede et al., 2010).
It is interesting to note here that there may be a paradox within this dimension.
That is, the US scores 26 on this dimension placing it very firmly in the short-term
category (Hofstede, 2014a). Although many Americans would agree that as a country we
do have a need to obtain absolute truth and have a short-term focus, it is unclear if we
would also say that we hold strong to social norms and traditions (part of the expanded
normative versus pragmatic aspect of this dimension). Indeed, Hofstede et al. (2010)
point out that these two seemingly opposite sets of norms (short-term orientation and
strong social norms) is the reason that there is much variation in the individual behaviors
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of people within normative societies (Hofstede et al., 2010). However, the aspect of
strong social norms could indicate a preference for policies and procedures that are inline with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines. That is, if a culture has a strong preference for
process control like that found in the procedural justice literature (Greenberg & Folger,
1983; Thibaut & Walker, 1975) one might expect stronger fairness perceptions
surrounding policies and practices that give them control. This suggests that individuals
from short-term oriented societies might be more sensitive to fairness.
However, as long-term oriented individuals are inclined to value keeping
relationships intact, this may indicate that these individuals place a greater importance on
fairness. The group-value model suggests that individuals are concerned with their longterm relationships (Lind & Tyler, 1988) and that treatment by a supervisor or the
organization can signal both standing within the organization and the desire for a longterm relationship. Support for this theory has demonstrated that individuals look to
procedural justice as a sign of standing within a group (Tyler, 1987) and a demonstration
that relationships are in fact important in justice judgments (Tyler, 1989). Furthermore, it
has also been shown that when trust is high, individuals may look past short-term rewards
and consider long-term rewards as well (Brockner, Chen, Mannix, Leung, & Skarlicki,
2000). It may be the case that fairness plays the same role in long-term orientation and
can be a signal of standing in the group as well as an indication that a continuing
relationship is desired. As such, those individuals who value long-term relationships will
also place a greater importance on procedural and interactional fairness compared to
short-term oriented individuals. Because there is no established research or theory
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regarding the long-term orientation dimension, this will be examined on an exploratory
basis.

Indulgence-Restraint
The final dimension is that of indulgence versus restraint (Hofstede et al., 2010).
Restraint refers to a society that limits gratification of needs and restricts that gratification
through strict social norms (Hofstede et al., 2010). Indulgent societies on the other hand
allow for free gratification of needs that relate to enjoying life and having fun (Hofstede
et al., 2010). As with the long-term orientation dimension, there has been no research
investigating the effects of this dimension on justice judgments. Additionally, given the
novelty of the dimension, there is no theory to guide how it might affect justice
perceptions. As an example, it might be that indulgent societies care strongly about
distributive fairness as this allows them the resources necessary to enjoy life and have
fun. On the other hand, restrictive societies might care more about distributive fairness as
this is a social norm and thus a way to control gratification. Either way, research on this
dimension will be of an exploratory nature thus no hypotheses are proposed.
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CHAPTER III
STUDY 1
Primary data was collected in this study to establish the extent to which faculty
governance varies cross-culturally and how fairly the faculty view the systems that
govern them. This was important to establish as it was possible that universities
structured faculty governance in accordance with cultural norms and thus, the faculty felt
fairly treated because it is what was expected in their culture. In this case there would
have been little to gain from measuring justice cross-culturally in the faculty context as
all faculty would have felt they are being treated fairly.
As culture is socially constructed (Weisinger & Salipante, 2000), it has been said
that the only way to truly understand such a phenomenon is from within (Berger &
Luckmann, 1966). And, as justice can be experienced differently within different cultures
(Guo & Giacobbe-Miller, 2012), given the dearth of research on the fairness of faculty
governance, triangulation as discussed by Jick (1979) was necessary in order to gain a
more holistic understanding of fairness reactions in university settings. Direct observation
would have been ideal but it was not feasible to conduct research using direct observation
within all of the countries and universities covered in this research. Furthermore, and as
discussed in Chapter II, there is already some understanding of the differences of fairness
concerns between cultures. Therefore, interviews were conducted in Study 1 of a
representative sample of the total number of countries that were surveyed in Study 2.
There were three goals of Study 1. The first was to further establish the extent to
which faculty governance varies country to country. This helped to answer one of the
proposed research questions by expanding our understanding of how much faculty
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governance differs country to country. The second was to help determine justice
judgment reactions to the varying faculty governance structures that exist worldwide.
This deepens our understanding of how culture impacts fairness perceptions of variations
in faculty governance. Based on the first two goals, the third goal was to help develop the
survey used in Study 2. Taken together, the two studies provide for triangulation and a
more valid and holistic understanding of justice cross-culturally.

Sample
Twelve faculty members working in ten different countries outside of the US
agreed to be interviewed. The countries were Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, India,
Ireland, Latvia, Spain, the UAE and UK. Interviewees were contacted through the
author’s personal connections. The sample was 58% female, 83% worked in a business
school, 50% were from the country they were working in, 75% were at the Assistant
Professor (or equivalent) level, 17% were at the Associate Professor (or equivalent) level,
and 8% were at the Full Professor (or equivalent) level. Interviewees lived in the country
they were working for an average of about 17 years and had about 7 years of experience
working in academia.

Procedure
Semi-structured interviews were conducted via the Internet. Interviews were
recorded to ensure accurate data collection and ranged in duration from about thirty
minutes to about one hour and fifteen minutes. As the UNESCO and AAUP guidelines
outlined above consisted of varying aspects of the employment relationship, I, too,
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focused the interview questions around various aspects of the employment relationship.
Specifically, I focused on academic freedom, as it is a central concern to both UNESCO
and AAUP guidelines. I also focused on the hiring process, the tenure or contract renewal
process, and the promotion/pay raise process as these require the enactment of procedures
and thus are related to procedural fairness. Finally, I asked about authority figures and the
extent to which they shared information regarding decisions that were made as this
relates to informational fairness. The list of questions asked during the interviews is:
(1)

What is the hiring process for faculty at your university? How are faculty
involved, if they are at all?
a. Is this hiring process the norm for universities in your country?
b. Do you think this process is fair?
c. Why or why not?

(2)

Are you familiar with the tenure process that exists at US universities? (If the
participant was not, I explained it to them.)
a. Do you have tenure (or the equivalent) at your University?
b. What is the tenure process (or its equivalent) like at your university?
c. Is this process the norm for universities in your country?
d. Do you think this process is fair?
e. Why or why not?

(3)

If tenure is not available and only fixed-term contracts are used, what is the
process for contract renewal?

(4)

How are rewards such as pay raises and promotions distributed at your university
(do faculty/students have input or is it just administration)?
a. Is this the same as in other universities in your country?
b. Is this fair?
c. Why or why not?

(5)

How is your Dean (or functional equivalent) appointed at your university?
a. Is this the norm for universities in your county?
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b. Is this system fair?
(6)

What are some of the things that you feel are needed to have a successful career?
a. Does your university and/or the administration in your department provide all
faculty equal access to these things?

(7)

Does your country have faculty guidelines like those of the American Association
of University Professor’s? (If the participant was not familiar with these
guidelines, I explained it to them.)
a. Does your university follow those guidelines?

(8)

How do faculty express disagreement with the decision of high-level
administrators at your university (if they do)?

(9)

Are you familiar with the concept of a vote of no confidence? (If the participant
was not familiar with this, I explained it to them.)
a. Is the practice in which faculty can take a vote of no confidence in its
administrators (or its equivalent) in effect within your university?
b. Is it effective?

Analysis
Recordings made from the interviews were transcribed, coded and entered into the
software program NVivo to establish patterns. Patterns were then analyzed to answer the
research questions and inform the creation of the survey used in Study 2.

Findings
Given the importance of academic freedom in the UNESCO/AAUP guidelines
and to the employment relationship of academic faculty, I will start my discussion of the
results of my interviews with this topic. Much like with the CAP survey results, most of
my respondents reported having academic freedom both with teaching and research,
including the interviewee from China. There are however, two notable findings that came
from discussions surrounding academic freedom. The first is that in Spain it seems that
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they may have more freedom in the classroom than what might be available in the US as
there does not seem to be a concern for “political correctness”. Indeed, the interviewee
from Spain said "I think it’s part of Spanish culture that to be politically correct is
laughed at, they think (people from the US) are idiots for being politically correct, (the
Spanish) say what there is to say." This appears to be so pervasive that instructors even
insult students and tell off-color jokes as a way to insight debate. The second is that in the
UAE there does seem to be limits on the amount of academic freedom but this is not
necessarily due to university interference. Instead, it seems that in the classroom students
may be unwilling to engage in discussions regarding controversial topics. And, in terms
of research, it is difficult as an academic to gain access to organizations much as it can be
in the US. Therefore, the limits on academic freedom in this instance may stem more
from cultural norms and other non-institutional forces.
The next aspect of the employment relationship that was discussed in the
interviews was faculty involvement in the hiring process. As mentioned above, according
to the AAUP, faculty should be the sole decision makers in the hiring of other faculty and
if justice perceptions were universally held, procedures varying from this would be seen
as unfair. Indeed, there was variation in terms of the procedures enacted to hire new
faculty members. In Canada, Bulgaria and the UK, it seems the hiring process is very
similar to that in the US and this is seen as fair. In both Ireland and Latvia, hiring
decisions seem to be made by authority figures with faculty having some input.
Interviewees from both of theses countries suggested that it might be fairer for a different
system to be in place. However, Spain and India had a similar system in which authority
figures made the decisions but this was not necessarily seen as unfair. Furthermore, in
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Brazil, private institutions are likely to have a closed search process in which personal
recommendation is the only way to get hired. The extent to which this is seen as fair is
reportedly dependent on the individual. When comparing this process to the open hiring
process that exists at public Brazilian institutions, my participant said "it’s difficult to say
(if it's fair or not) because, as I said to you, even when you have this public and blind
process, it’s still a small community so everyone knows each other." This is in contrast to
the Bulgarian respondent who stated that a “competitive process is the fairest way to gain
an academic position."
Regarding the extent to which tenure exists at universities across this sample, only
two respondents (from Canada and India) reported having a tenure system similar to that
in the US and the extent to which that exists country wide for India remains a question
mark. In Brazil and Ireland, tenure also exists but occurs after 3 years. In Bulgaria and
China tenure exists except it comes from your initial hiring. That is, once you are hired,
you have lifelong employment. In Latvia and the UK, faculty have fixed-term contracts.
All of the participants from these eight countries reported their systems as being fair. One
interesting variation occurs in the case of Spain. The interviewee said that in Spain they
call it tenure but “due to Spanish labor law, they have to pay you more if they want to fire
you, they will have to pay you a larger severance package, that’s really all (tenure) means
but they can still fire you any time they want. It’s just the amount they would have to pay
you increases over time.” When asked the extent to which this was perceived as fair, the
interviewee responded by saying that “yes, as long as you have a good relationship with
the Dean and your research is of high quality (it is fair) but there is ambiguity in terms of
standards as nothing is in writing.” Another significant departure in terms of employment
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security comes from the UAE where my interviewee reported that there is a three- or
four-year fixed term contract but you are “never immune from getting fired for whatever
reason.” In this case it was not the fact that you could be fired at any point for any reason
(this is very similar to the employment-at-will principle that exists in the private sector in
the US) as seen as unfair but that there was no recourse or appeal that could be made.
In terms of pay raises and promotions, in all but Latvia, participants reported that
they are available. In the case of Latvia, pay is tied to education level and teaching load
with the number of courses and students taught the determining factor in pay. The
Latvian participant reported that it would be fairer if pay raises were also tied to research
productivity. In terms of the other nine countries, the manner in which promotions and
pay raises are awarded ranges from faculty committee to university authority figures and
the extent to which these systems are perceived as fair ranges as well. It seems that the
biggest issue that faculty have with the promotion/pay raise systems is a lack of
coherence or transparency. This speaks to the results of questions regarding the extent to
which authority figures or decision makers freely share information. Participants from
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, India and the UK all reported that decision makers freely
shared information with the participant from India going as far as to say that “I don’t
think there is any other place in the world where you can be treated as well as here.” In
terms of Latvia, the feeling was generally that decision makers did share information but
during the recent recession, the amount of sharing decreased as a lack of pay raises over
multiple years created a “negative environment”. This environment made it so that
sharing information and seeking input became too time-consuming as other issues were
always raised that detracted from the issue at hand. In China, Ireland and Spain,
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participants said that authority figures did not share information and that it would be
desirable if they did. In the case of Ireland, it was said that worse than not sharing
information, authority figures and decision makers did not follow suggestions from
faculty when they solicited them. In the case of Spain, the participant pointed to a lack of
transparency again lamenting the lack of formal guidelines.
The final set of questions sought to determine how authority figures were decided
upon and who had power in terms of decision-making. In terms of the former, in Ireland,
Spain, the UAE, and UK, deans (or the functional equivalent) are decided upon by
authority figures further up with limited to no involvement by faculty. This is also how it
works in China but faculty in this case “ratify” the Dean or Department Chair. However,
the Chinese participant said that rarely do faculty fail to ratify a chosen candidate,
suggesting that power in this case rests with authority figures. In Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, India, and Latvia deans and department chairs are decided on by faculty vote. In
terms of the latter, only the interviewee from Canada reported faculty having a similar
amount of decision-making power as is the norm in the US. Although the interviewee
from India also reported a high amount of faculty involvement, it was said that most of
the decision-making power in this case rested with the senior faculty, as junior faculty did
not necessarily have the expertise necessary to make the best decision. In Brazil,
Bulgaria, the UAE, and UK faculty provide input into decision-making but authority
figures are the ones making the final decisions. In China, Ireland, Latvia, and Spain
authority figures are the decision makers with little, if any, input from the faculty.
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Discussion
The results of this research seem to indicate that, with the exception of
informational justice, there is some ambiguity in term of the extent to which fairness
rules are universal or culturally dependent in the faculty governance context. In the case
of academic freedom, there was one instance in which the amount of academic freedom
that was reported by the interviewee from the UAE was less than what was outlined by
UNESCO/AAUP guidelines. In this case the lack of said freedom was more the result of
the culture than the employer and this was not necessarily seen as unfair. This would
seem to hold with results reported in the Chinese sample from the CAP survey in which it
was understood that Chinese faculty had less academic freedom than their counterparts in
other countries but still reported having a comparatively average amount of academic
freedom (Postiglione & Shiru, 2011). However, in the case of Spain the perception is that
they have more academic freedom than their counterparts in the US. Given the seemingly
vehement support for this level of academic freedom that was reported by my
interviewee, it seems to indicate that if Spanish faculty had less academic freedom than
they currently have they would perceive it as very unfair. This seems to support the idea
that the more academic freedom a faculty member has, the fairer they will judge it. Taken
together, these results provide ambiguity as to the extent to which justice judgments
regarding the fairness of academic freedom will be universal or culturally dependent.
This uncertainty is furthered by the fact that the interviewees from Spain and the UAE
were not actually from those countries. Thus, it seems that questions surrounding the
perceived fairness of academic freedom in the survey used for Study 2 were required.
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In the case of the hiring of colleagues, tenure, and promotion/pay raises there is
variation across these procedures but this did not lead to unanimous feelings or
perceptions of unfairness across the interviewees. Furthermore, when denied voice in
decision-making and the selection of authority figures both of which exist at universities
in the US and are suggested as important by UNESCO/AAUP standards, this did not
increase perceptions of unfairness. This seems to indicate that the above outlined systems
that are in place in countries like Argentina, Germany, and Hong Kong are deemed fair
even though they do not provide the same level of faculty involvement as the
UNESCO/AAUP standards provide. This is also interesting in light of evidence that there
are some selection methods used in hiring that are deemed more fair than others
regardless of country (Anderson & Witvliet, 2008; Bertolino & Steiner, 2007; Moscoso
& Salgado, 2004). Together, this suggests that there is a certain amount of cultural
dependence in terms of what constitutes fair. Therefore, questions surrounding these
aspects of the employment relationship were included on the Study 2 survey to see how
culture impacts the perceived fairness of these governance systems.
Finally, in terms of questions regarding the amount of information shared by
authority figures and decision makers, it seems that when information was perceived as
lacking, it was also perceived as unfair. This fits with the expectation of transparency
outlined in the UNESCO/AAUP guidelines; the lower the transparency, the lower the
perceived fairness. There are two possible explanations for this phenomenon. The first is
that there is universality to the need for transparency of information in employee
governance. The second is that academics (the population sampled here) may be more
inclined to seek information and therefore expect it in employment relationships. Either
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way, the results here seem to indicate a need to include more questions surrounding
informational justice than just those looking at the fairness of performance appraisal
processes. Therefore, questions surrounding the information provided during the hiring
process were also included in the Study 2 survey.
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CHAPTER IV
STUDY 2
Like Study 1, primary data was collected for this study in order to test the
hypotheses proposed in Chapter II. Data collection was survey based and relied on
theoretical background and the information collected in Study 1 to inform survey
formation. A pre-test was conducted and validity evidence suggested that the survey was
appropriate for testing the proposed relationships.

Sample
As explained in Chapter I, the context being used to test the proposed hypotheses
is faculty governance within universities. In an effort to eliminate confounding variables
based on differences between disciplines within universities, only faculty from
management/business schools were used in the final sample. A dummy coded variable
was used to control for the effect of participants who were working in one country but
were from a different one (i.e. working in the United Arab Emirates but from Canada).
Given the unwritten rule of hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) that it is necessary to
have twenty unique samples at Level 2 (Sayer, 2012), the goal was to have individuals
working in twenty different countries represented in the final analysis. My final sample
consisted of individuals working in 47 unique countries!
Personal contacts and university websites were used to recruit participants.
Recruitment emails were sent to twenty of the author’s personal contacts who then
forwarded the email to an untold number of their personal contacts. 144 survey responses
were returned through personal contacts. After non-business school faculty, doctoral

75

students and incomplete surveys were removed, there were 83 usable responses
remaining. Although this sample had a sufficient number of countries to meet the HLM
rule (there were 24 represented), a sample of 83 individuals was not sufficient to conduct
hypothesis testing. Therefore, the decision was made to send recruitment emails directly
to faculty working in business schools at universities worldwide. This had the added
benefit of reducing bias caused by recruitment that relied on personal networks and
snowball techniques.
10,872 survey requests were sent directly to faculty at universities worldwide with
reminders sent two to four weeks later. Contact information for faculty was obtained
from university websites. There were 1,423 survey responses returned from university
faculty of which 1,061 contained usable data. The overall response rate was 14.4% and
the final data set contains 1,144 usable responses. The sample is 36% female, age range is
0.3% between the ages of 18 and 24, 3.6% between the ages of 25 and 29, 9.5% between
the ages of 30 and 34, 15.3% between the ages of 35 and 39, 16.3% between the ages of
40 and 44, 16.7% between the ages of 45 and 49, 14.6% between the ages of 50 and 54,
9.8% between the ages of 55 and 59, 7.1% between the ages of 60 and 64, and 6.6% over
the age of 65. 49% of respondents are from the country they are currently working in and
also obtained their PhD there, on average have lived in the country they are working in
for 17 years, have an average of 17 years working in academia, 11 years working at their
current university, 75% work at a public institution, 22% report that their institution is
research focused, 9% report that their institution is teaching focused, and 69% report that
their institution is both research and teaching focused. 3.6% are at the Lecturer (US
definition) or Fellow level, 25.3% are at the Assistant (or equivalent) level, 31% are at
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the Associate Professor (or equivalent) level, 23.0% are at the Full Professor (or
equivalent) level, 5.4% are Department Chairs or Administrators (Associate Dean’s), and
0.8% are Emeriti. Additionally, doctoral students were taken out of the sample if it could
be determined that they were not a part of the faculty (like is the case in the US).
However, based on discussions with participants in Study 1, it was determined that in
some countries doctoral students work on their degrees and are employed at the Assistant
Professor (or equivalent) level. Therefore, the sample also consists of 7% doctoral
students.

Procedure
Participants were contacted via email. Specific language in the email for the
recruitment of participants was as follows:
As part of my doctoral dissertation, I am currently conducting research on the
effects of national culture on the perceived fairness of faculty governance
systems. Data is being obtained from faculty in business schools worldwide. You
are being contacted because you are currently a faculty member working in a
business school at a university. Your participation will be greatly appreciated and
will only take approximately 20 minutes of your time. If you are willing to
participate please follow the link below.

Participants were then directed to a Qualtrics survey consisting of an informed
consent form, demographic questions, items measuring organizational justice, items
measuring perceived faculty power over decisions, and some open ended questions
designed to gain a more holistic understanding of faculty governance worldwide.
Cultural value scores were obtained from Hofstede’s website. Obtaining measures
of variables from Hofstede’s website was advantageous in that it reduced concerns with
common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) as variables are
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obtained from multiple sources. However, although Hofstede’s website has data for 101
countries (Hofstede, 2014a), the data is not complete. For instance, values for the
indulgence versus restraint dimension only exist for 93 countries (Hofstede, 2014c).
Although the original data for the cultural dimensions came from IBM in the late 1960’s
and early 1970’s and only included 40 countries (Hofstede, 1980a), the data for the
original four dimensions (Individualism, Power Distance, Masculinity, and Uncertainty
Avoidance) has since been expanded to include 76 countries and is no longer only based
on responses gathered from IBM employees (Hofstede, 2014c). As there is no reason to
believe that there are systematic reasons for countries either being included or not
included in this data set other than convenience sampling, there is not a concern about
missing country data as a result of sampling bias.
Given the differences in faculty governance processes cross-culturally that were
explicated in Chapter I, this unique context provided for an examination of fairness
perceptions based on naturally existing phenomena. Finally, despite differences in the
justice construct cross-culturally (Guo & Giacobbe-Miller, 2012), the organizational
justice measures for procedural, informational and interpersonal justice were based on the
Colquitt (2001) scales as these have been validated cross-culturally (Fischer et al., 2011).
However, cultural equivalence testing was still necessary for the current sample given the
many different countries represented in the sample. The measures for the fairness of
organizational level distributive justice (academic freedom) were based on the fairness of
an organizational policy measure established by Greenberg (1994). For most of the scale
items a 6-point Likert type scale was chosen to avoid central tendency bias that exists in
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some Asian cultures like China (C. Hui, Lee, & Rousseau, 2004). The justice scales were
modified to test the proposed hypotheses.
Even though multiple studies have demonstrated the reliability of the justice
measures [e.g. (Colquitt, 2001; Fischer et al., 2011)], a reliability test was run to ensure
the reliability of the measures in this study. A reliability test was also run on the faculty
control items. With the exception of the academic freedom (AF) scale, all scales had
reliabilities above .90. The AF scale had a .82 reliability, which is acceptable for
hypothesis testing.
Evidence of the validity of the multi-factor model of the organizational justice
measurement has been found for the US (Colquitt, 2001) and for a number of other
countries (Fischer et al., 2011). However, as the current sample comprises people
working in 47 different countries it was necessary to conduct both a CFA and a construct
equivalence test. A CFA and a construct equivalence test was also tested for the
measurement of the faculty control variables. CFAs were conducted on the organizational
justice and faculty control scales to provide evidence for using the eight- and sevenfactor structure respectively. Goodness-of-fit statistics such as RMSEA, CFI, and GFI,
were examined to check the overall fit of the measurement model. To conduct the
construct equivalence tests the steps outlined by Byrne (2009) were used to test
configural invariance and measurement invariance. To test for scalar invariance the
procedures outlined by Hult et al. (2008) were used.
As establishing what proportion of justice perceptions is culturally based was one
of the questions the research is attempting to answer, a hierarchical linear modeling
(HLM) approach was used for testing the hypotheses. HLM was the most appropriate
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analysis technique for testing the proposed hypotheses as it allows for multi-level
analysis in which the proportion of variance that is attributable to different levels can be
determined. In this case, Level 1 was the individual-level and Level 2 was the countrylevel. Although there are no previously published articles that have determined the
minimum sample size required for drawing valid conclusions from HLM analysis, a
commonly held rule is twenty unique Level 2 data points (Sayer, 2012). This can be
reduced (to as few as 12) if there is a large enough sample size at Level 1. However, as
stated above, the current sample consists of 47 unique countries.
SPSS 22.0 was used to test reliabilities. AMOS 22.0 was used to conduct the
CFAs and construct equivalence and HLM 7.0 was used to conduct the HLM analysis.

Analysis
Measures
All of the governance measures are designed such that increased levels of control
(governance) indicate increased compliance with UNESCO/AAUP standards. Descriptive
statistics and correlations for all of the variables in this study are listed in Table 1. Except
where noted, response options for governance and justice measures were 6-point Likert
items with anchors of “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree”. An option of “Do Not
Know/Unsure” was also provided for individuals who may not be familiar with the
governance procedures in their university or did not have an opinion about its fairness.
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Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations

Mean
1

Female

2

YearsLiving

3

IndustryTenure

4

ResearchFocus

5

TeachingFocus

6

LifeOneCountry

7

HireCont

8

TenCont

9

PerfCont

10

PromCont

11

AF

12

InfoHire

13

InfoProm

14

Guidelines

15

PJHire

16

PJTenureCont

17

PJPerf

18

PJProm

19

DJAF

20

IJHire

21

IJProm

22

IPJ

23

PD

24

IND

25

Masc

26

UA

27

LongTerm

28

Indul

Std.
Deviation

1

2

3

4

5

0.36

0.48

N.A.

16.98

12.44

-.070*

N.A.

16.57

10.22

**

.635**

N.A.

0.22

0.41

-.063*

-.054

-.005

N.A.

0.09

0.29

.039

-.039

-.039

-.168**

N.A.

0.49

0.50

.078**

.388**

.102**

-.062*

-.096**

4.66

1.25

-.071*

.037

.013

.089**

-.079**

4.00

1.41

-.049

.087**

.013

.082*

-.126**

3.71

1.36

-.031

.009

.029

-.003

-.059

3.85

1.34

-.092**

.021

.032

.002

-.072*

4.87

0.92

-.126**

.063

.094**

.115**

-.045

3.64

1.36

-.052

.034

.049

.040

-.110**

3.62

1.38

-.015

.009

.022

-.028

-.082*

2.88

0.77

-.125**

.137**

.173**

.031

-.120**

4.10

1.08

-.100**

.055

.047

.054

-.092**

3.93

1.13

-.116**

.102**

.061

.072*

-.106**

3.98

1.10

-.070*

.042

.059

.036

-.041

3.89

1.16

-.091*

.056

.085*

.047

-.039

5.00

1.10

*

*

*

**

-.100**

3.73

1.28

-.043

.088*

.063

.046

-.129**

3.78

1.28

-.037

.055

.033

-.014

-.048

4.52

1.00

-.055

.060

.064

.044

-.104**

49.92

24.71

.141**

-.120**

-.117**

-.100**

.133**

59.76

26.04

-.053

.183**

.116**

.081**

-.170**

46.93

20.83

.075*

.052

.013

.086**

-.002

48.45

21.02

-.007

.019

.027

-.050

.121**

41.67

18.80

-.046

-.135**

-.056

.088**

-.034

60.04

18.52

.023

.143**

.136**

-.050

-.037

-.154

-.080

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Reliabilities on the
diagonal

81

.080

.078

.111

Table 1 (cont’d): Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1

Female

2

YearsLiving

3

IndustryTenure

4

ResearchFocus

5

TeachingFocus

6

LifeOneCountry

7

HireCont

.081**

0.942

8

TenCont

.142**

.507**

0.925

9

PerfCont

*

**

.584**

0.906

10

PromCont

.052

.503**

.662**

.679**

0.909

11

AF

.007

.241

**

**

**

.292**

0.819

12

InfoHire

.050

.471**

.468**

.496**

.538**

.413**

0.964

13

InfoProm

.037

.402

**

**

**

**

**

.749**

14

Guidelines

.057

.386**

.381**

.402**

.427**

.424**

.572**

15

PJHire

.050

.661**

.456**

.516**

.493**

.386**

.679**

16

PJTenureCont

.086*

.490**

.663**

.596**

.605**

.450**

.663**

17

PJPerf

.027

.459**

.477**

.688**

.564**

.436**

.628**

18

PJProm

.018

.471**

.568**

.616**

.726**

.466**

.666**

19

DJAF

.063

.279**

.241**

.289**

.309**

.742**

.429**

20

IJHire

.086*

.494**

.476**

.509**

.508**

.421**

.858**

21

IJProm

.090*

.439**

.440**

.467**

.522**

.398**

.738**

22

IPJ

.054

.413**

.412**

.455**

.457**

.518**

.630**

23

PD

-.092**

.092**

.047

.159**

.104**

-.081*

.035

24

IND

.273**

-.017

.012

-.065*

-.070*

.021

-.022

25

Masc

*

-.042

-.079*

26

UA

27

LongTerm

28

Indul

N.A.

.076

.452

.256

.418

.255

.479

.550

.345

**

-.001

-.037

-.005

-.111**

-.001

-.073*

-.032

-.014

.057

-.017

.014

**

**

**

*

.061

.103**

-.060

-.064

-.016

-.085

.132**

.141

-.139**

.091

-.105**

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Reliabilities on the
diagonal

82

.106

-.071*

-.068

.082

Table 1 (cont’d): Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations

13

14

15

16

1

Female

2

YearsLiving

3

IndustryTenure

4

ResearchFocus

5

TeachingFocus

6

LifeOneCountry

7

HireCont

8

TenCont

9

PerfCont

10

PromCont

11

AF

12

InfoHire

13

InfoProm

14

Guidelines

15

PJHire

16

PJTenureCont

17

PJPerf

18

PJProm

19

DJAF

20

IJHire

.738**

.641**

.689**

21

IJProm

.874**

.634**

22

IPJ

.576**

23

PD

24

IND

25

Masc

26

UA

27

LongTerm

28

Indul

17

18

19

0.973
.571**

0.908

**

.578**

0.901

.616**

.615**

.744**

0.917

**

**

**

.799**

0.919

.602

.616

.599

.708

.688**

.622**

.687**

.781**

.788**

0.927

**

**

**

**

**

.478**

0.957

.680**

.663**

.683**

.463**

.638**

.672**

.635**

.731**

.413**

.579**

.607**

.624**

.628**

.603**

.554**

.094**

-.108**

.104**

.020

.041

.041

-.241**

-.065

.142**

-.065

.021

-.002

-.022

.168**

-.089*

.004

-.029

-.047

-.063

-.079*

-.093**

.004

-.102*

-.009

-.090*

-.030

-.011

-.002

**

.010

.132

**

**

**

*

.075*

-.020

.093*

-.125**

-.018

.047

.349

.094

.447

.398

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Reliabilities on the
diagonal

83

.486

.100

-.029

.485

.100

-.047

.090

Table 1 (cont’d): Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

1

Female

2

YearsLiving

3

IndustryTenure

4

ResearchFocus

5

TeachingFocus

6

LifeOneCountry

7

HireCont

8

TenCont

9

PerfCont

10

PromCont

11

AF

12

InfoHire

13

InfoProm

14

Guidelines

15

PJHire

16

PJTenureCont

17

PJPerf

18

PJProm

19

DJAF

20

IJHire

21

IJProm

.811**

0.956

22

IPJ

.624**

.591**

0.911

23

PD

.039

.031

-.076*

N.A.

24

IND

.018

.019

.053

-.787**

N.A.

25

Masc

-.043

-.058

*

**

-.023

N.A.

26

UA

-.056

-.006

.020

.263**

-.227**

.190**

N.A.

27

LongTerm

**

**

**

-.052

N.A.

28

Indul

-.098**

-.218**

-.386**

0.954

-.092

.265

*

.047

.016

.190

-.018

.002

.032

-.511**

.085

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Reliabilities on the
diagonal

84

-.227

.555**

-.249

Hiring Control (HireCont) was a 5-item scale. Survey item asked respondents to
indicate the extent that they agree that faculty control the following aspects of the hiring
process: Recruitment of candidates, Selection of candidates for interviews, Interviewing
candidates, Selecting candidates to be hired, Preventing undesired hires. The Cronbach’s
alpha for this measure is 0.94.
Tenure/Contract Extension Control (TenCont) was a 3-item scale. Items asked
respondents to indicate the extent that they agree that faculty control the following
aspects of the tenure/contract extension process: Setting standards for tenure/contract
extensions, Evaluating cases for tenure/contract extensions, Recommending peers for
tenure/contract extensions. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is 0.93.
Performance Evaluation Control (PerfCont) was a 4-item scale. Items asked
respondents to indicate the extent that they agree that faculty control the following
aspects of the performance evaluation process: Setting the standard for performance,
Conducting evaluations of peers, Providing feedback to peers, Determining when
performance evaluations occur. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is 0.91.
Promotion Control (PromCont) was a 4-item scale. Items asked respondents to
indicate the extent that they agree that faculty control the following aspects of
promotions: Setting standards for promotion, Evaluating faculty promotion cases,
Recommending peers for promotion, Determining when promotion occurs. The
Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is 0.91.
Academic Freedom (AF) was a 5-item scale. Items asked respondents to indicate
the extent that they agree that faculty had the following aspects of academic freedom:
Selecting research topics, Determining publication outlets, Researching without
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administrative or government interference, Teaching without administrative or
government interference, Determining course content. The Cronbach’s alpha for this
measure is 0.82.
Information in Hiring (InfoHire) was a 4-item scale. Items asked respondents to
indicate the extent that they agree that authority figures shared information regarding the
following aspects of the hiring process: Freely share information regarding hiring
decisions, Provide clear information regarding hiring decisions, Provide adequate
information regarding hiring decisions, Communicate transparently. The Cronbach’s
alpha for this measure is 0.96.
Information in Promotion (InfoProm) was a 4-item scale. Items asked respondents
to indicate the extent that they agree that authority figures shared information regarding
the following aspects of the promotion process: Freely share information regarding
promotion/tenure decisions, Provide clear information regarding promotion/tenure
decisions, Provide adequate information regarding promotion/tenure decisions,
Communicate transparently. As the promotion and tenure process can be two separate
employment actions, ideally this scale would have been split into one focusing on the
information provided for tenure/ contract renewals and one focusing on the information
provided for the promotion process. However, given a concern of survey fatigue, it was
decided that the promotion/ tenure questions could be combined. The Cronbach’s alpha
for this measure is 0.97.
University Guidelines (Guidelines) was a 6-item scale. Item asked respondents to
indicate the extent that they agree that their university has guidelines for the following
aspects of the employment relationship: Recruitment of new faculty, Hiring of new
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faculty, Tenure of faculty (if available), Contract extensions of faculty, Promotion of
faculty to higher ranks, Academic freedom. Responses for this measure were on a 4-point
scale with options of “no guidelines”, “some guidelines”, “clear guidelines”, and “clear
guidelines that are followed”. An option of “Do Not Know/Unsure” was provided for
individuals who may not be familiar with the governance procedures in their university.
The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is 0.91. Although the items of this scale deal with
different aspects of the employment relationship, this variable serves as a proxy for
establishing the extent to which policies are in-line with UNESCO/AAUP standards. The
aspects of the employment relationship mentioned in this scale are discussed in
UNESCO/AAUP guidelines and the high alpha of the scale seems to indicate that
guidelines in one area of the employment relationship indicate a high probability of there
being guidelines in another area.
Procedural Justice in Hiring (PJHire) was a 7-item scale. A sample item asks
respondents to indicate the extent that they agree “Faculty have influence over the
decision to hire new faculty members”. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is 0.90.
Procedural Justice in Tenure/Contract Decisions (PJTenCont) was a 7-item scale.
A sample item asks respondents to indicate the extent that they agree “Faculty have
influence over the tenure/contract decision procedures”. The Cronbach’s alpha for this
measure is 0.92.
Procedural Justice in Performance Decisions (PJPerf) was a 7-item scale. A
sample item asks respondents to indicate the extent that they agree “Faculty have
influence over the procedures”. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is 0.92.
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Procedural Justice in Promotion Decisions (PJProm) was a 7-item scale. A
sample item asks respondents to indicate the extent that they agree “Faculty have
influence over the procedures”. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is 0.93.
Distributive Justice of Academic Freedom (DJAF) was a 4-item scale. A sample
item asks respondents to indicate the extent that they “support (their) university’s
academic freedom policy”. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is 0.96.
Informational Justice of Hiring (IJHire) was a 5-item scale. A sample item asks
respondents to indicate the extent that they agree “The criteria for the decisions are
thoroughly explained” by authority figures. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is
0.95.
Informational Justice of Promotion Decisions (IJProm) was a 5-item scale. A
sample item asks respondents to indicate the extent that they agree “The criteria for the
decisions are thoroughly explained” by authority figures. The Cronbach’s alpha for this
measure is 0.96.
Interpersonal Justice (IPJ) was a 7-item scale. A sample item asks respondents to
indicate the extent that they agree authority figures “Treat you in a polite manner”. The
Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is 0.91.
Country was coded as a categorical variable with each country having a unique
identifying number and represents the country in which the participant is currently living.
Table 2 lists the countries represented in this study.
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Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Chile
China
Columbia
Denmark
Egypt

Table 2: Countries Represented in Sample
Estonia
Lebanon
Philippines
Finland
Lithuania
Poland
France
Luxembourg
Russia
Greece
Malaysia
Saudi Arabia
Hong Kong
Mexico
Singapore
Iceland
Netherlands
South Africa
India
New Zealand
South Korea
Ireland
Norway
Sweden
Japan
Pakistan
Switzerland
Jordan
Peru
Taiwan

Thailand
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Portugal
Bulgaria
Croatia

Control Variables. Sex, years working in current country, current institution focus, years
working in academia, and life spent in the same country were all included as control
variables. Although data were collected for age, current institution type, years working at
current institution, and status as a current student, in keeping with a recent call to limit
the inclusion of control variables unless necessary (Spector & Brannick, 2011), these
were not included in the final analysis as they were not theoretically important and a
correlation analysis revealed they were not correlated with the variables of interest. Sex
was measured as a categorical variable coded as 0 “male”, 1 “female”. Years working in
the current country and years working in academia were measured as continuous
variables. Current institution focus was split into two variables “teaching” and “research”
and dummy coded. Life spent in the same country was measured as a categorical variable
coded as 0 “No”, 1 “Yes” and represents a faculty member working in the same country
s/he is from and where s/he obtained her/his PhD.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis
In order to further test the validity of the organizational justice measures in
hypothesis testing, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) analysis was conducted. Results
89

are reported in Table 3. There were 49 items included in this analysis. These items were
from the measures of procedural justice in hiring (PJHire), procedural justice in
tenure/contract decisions (PJTenCont), procedural justice in performance review
(PJPerf), procedural justice in promotion decisions (PJProm), distributive justice of
academic freedom (DJAF), informational justice of hiring (IJHire), informational justice
of promotion decisions (IJProm), and interpersonal justice (IPJ). Results indicate that the
eight-factor model was significantly better than either the four-factor or one-factor
models. Although the CFI and RMSEA of the eight-factor model suggest poor fit, as
these are the dependent variables being tested in separate HLM models, this CFA was
conducted to demonstrate that an eight-factor model was a better fit than a one-factor or
four-factor model. Given the significant difference in the χ2 statistic and CFI value
between the four-factor model and eight-factor model, this test served its purpose to
justify the use of the eight-factor model.

One-factor
Four-factor
Eight-factor

Table 3: Justice Variables CFA
χ2
Δχ2
df
Δdf CFI
ΔCFI RMSEA
12,375.76
1127
0.562
0.147
4805.647
6
0.197
0.112
2051.979
22
0.069
0.093

In order to further test the validity of the faculty control variables for hypothesis
testing, a CFA was also conducted on these variables. Results are reported in Table 4.
There were 29 items included in this analysis. These items were from the measures of
governance of hiring (HireCont), governance of tenure/contract (TenCont), governance
of performance evaluations (PerfCont), governance of promotion (PromCont),
governance of academic freedom (AF), governance of information in hiring (InfoHire),
and governance of information in promotion (InfoProm). Results indicate that the seven-

90

factor model was significantly better than either the five-factor or one-factor models. The
CFI and RMSEA of the seven-factor model suggest reasonable model fit. However, and
like the organizational justice CFA discussed above, these independent variables are
being tested in separate HLM models. Thus, this CFA was conducted to demonstrate that
a seven-factor model was a better fit than other models. Given the significant difference
in the χ2 statistic and CFI value between the five-factor model and seven-factor model,
this test served its purpose to justify the use of the seven-factor model.

One-factor
Five-factor
Seven-factor

Table 4: Faculty Control Variables CFA
χ2
Δχ2
df
Δdf CFI
ΔCFI RMSEA
8619.841
377
0.488
0.204
5250.218
10
0.326
0.125
1228.560
11
0.132
0.068

Construct Equivalence Tests
As this study involves cross-cultural comparisons amongst 47 countries, construct
equivalence needs to be established in order to verify that the constructs are represented
equivalently across countries. This process begins by establishing configural equivalence
which determines if the factor loading patterns are the same across groups. This model
then serves as the baseline against which subsequent models are compared. Once
configural equivalence is established, measurement equivalence can be checked.
Measurement equivalence is the extent to which parameters comprising the measurement
of variables are similar across cultural groups. In a measurement model, parameters are
estimated for one group and estimates for all remaining groups are constrained to equal
those of this group. If the change in χ2 or CFI is statistically non-significant, full
measurement equivalence is established. Finally, scalar equivalence must be established
to demonstrate that the intercepts are equal across groups.

91

Ideally, construct equivalence testing is conducted on all of the unique groups
represented in a sample. However, given the constraints of SEM I was not able to
conduct construct equivalence testing on all of the countries individually. Instead, I
conducted two separate construct equivalence tests; one used quartile separation of the
power distance (PD) dimension to break the sample into four groups, the other broke the
sample into what could be termed as “The West” and “The Rest”. As many of my
variables involve a distinction between faculty and authority figures, the use of PD was
logical given that it is a dimension concerned with the separation between those with
authority and those without it. Breaking the counties into The West and The Rest groups
comes from the idea that there are other characteristics besides proximity that can
indicate similarities between countries (Inglehart & Carballo, 1997).
Organizational Justice Variables
The construct equivalence test results for the organizational justice variables using
the PD grouping are reported in Table 5. Results indicate configural equivalence for all
organizational justice variables using the PD grouping. Three of the procedural justice
variables (PJHire, PJTenCont, and PJProm) required two of the error variances to be
constrained. These constraints were left in place for subsequent construct equivalence
tests. As results indicated between group configural equivalence for all variables, the next
step was to test measurement equivalence.
Based on the chi-squared and CFI difference tests, results indicate measurement
equivalence for the following organizational justice variables: PJHire, PJTenCont,
PJPerf, PJProm, IJHire, IJProm, and IPJ. Based on the CFI difference test, results
indicate measurement equivalence for DJAF. As the change in CFI of the DJAF variable
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was well below acceptable cutoffs, this indicates that even though the chi-square test was
significant, this was still culturally invariant. Therefore, as results indicated between
group measurement equivalence for all variables, the final step was to test scalar
equivalence.
Based on the chi-squared and CFI difference tests, results indicate scalar
equivalence for the following organizational justice variables: PJPerf, PJProm, IJHire,
and IJProm. Based on the CFI difference test, results indicate scalar equivalence for
PJTenCont. Results indicate scalar variance for the following organizational justice
variables: PJHire, DJAF, and IPJ. The significant differences of both the chi-square and
CFI values in the PJHire, DJAF and IPJ variables indicate that the scales of these
measures are different cross-culturally, this is not surprising given what cross-cultural
research has demonstrated regarding the preferences of some cultures to use extreme
scores while others favor neutral scores (Hult et al., 2008; Steenkamp & Baumgartner,
1998). One way to ensure scalar equivalence even when difference tests suggest cultural
variance is to use centered scores. Centering the scores was done in the HLM program
which was used in hypothesis testing. Thus, it can be concluded that there is scalar
equivalence.
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Table 5: Construct Equivalence for Justice Variables PD Grouping
Configural Invariance
χ2
Δχ2
df
Δdf
sig.?
GFI
CFI
ΔCFI
PJHire
177.402
52
0.965
0.967
PJTenCont
244.451
52
0.909
0.950
PJPerf
388.235
56
0.865
0.916
PJProm
187.312
52
0.993
0.968
DJAF
58.378
8
0.967
0.987
IJHire
139.626
20
0.930
0.973
IJProm
144.575
20
0.925
0.970
IPJ
434.662
56
0.842
0.910

RMSEA
0.061
0.072
0.087
0.059
0.085
0.087
0.092
0.099

Measurement Invariance
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PJHire
PJTenCont
PJPerf
PJProm
DJAF
IJHire
IJProm
IPJ

23.555
21.210
15.725
23.048
22.863
11.017
11.713
11.948

18
18
18
18
17
12
12
18

n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
sig.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.

0.939
0.902
0.860
0.928
0.954
0.924
0.920
0.840

0.001
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.003
0.001
0.000
0.002

0.047
0.062
0.076
0.052
0.066
0.069
0.073
0.085

Table 5 (cont’d): Construct Equivalence for Justice Variables PD Grouping
Scalar Invariance
PJHire
80.340
21
sig.
0.016
PJTenCont
41.452
21
sig.
0.006
PJPerf
30.156
21
n.s.
0.002
PJProm
25.995
21
n.s.
0.001
DJAF
148.873
29
sig.
0.015
IJHire
15.444
15
n.s.
0.000
IJProm
13.679
15
n.s.
0.000
IPJ
67.780
21
sig.
0.011

0.049
0.057
0.068
0.046
0.069
0.057
0.060
0.080
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The construct equivalence test results for the organizational justice variables using
the 2 Region grouping are reported in Table 6. Results indicate configural equivalence for
all organizational justice variables using the 2 Region grouping. As with the tests run
using the PD grouping, three of the procedural justice variables (PJHire, PJTenCont, and
PJProm) required two of the error variances to be constrained. These constraints were left
in place for subsequent construct equivalence tests. As results indicated between group
configural equivalence for all variables, the next step was to test measurement
equivalence.
Based on the chi-squared and CFI difference tests, results indicate measurement
equivalence for the following organizational justice variables: PJHire, PJTenCont,
PJPerf, PJProm, IJHire, IJProm, and IPJ. Based on the CFI difference test, results
indicate measurement equivalence for DJAF. As the change in CFI of the DJAF variable
was well below acceptable cutoffs, this indicates that even though the chi-square test was
significant, this was still culturally invariant. Therefore, as results indicated between
group measurement equivalence for all variables, the final step was to test scalar
equivalence.
Based on the chi-squared and CFI difference tests, results indicate scalar
equivalence for the following organizational justice variables: PJPerf, PJProm, IJHire,
and IJProm. Based on the CFI difference test, results indicate scalar equivalence for the
following organizational justice variables: PJTenCont, DJAF, and IPJ. Results indicate
scalar variance for PJHire. As discussed above in the scalar equivalence test run on the
PD grouping, one way to ensure scalar equivalence even when difference tests suggest
cultural variance is to use centered scores. Centering the scores was done in the HLM
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program which was used for hypothesis testing. Thus, it can be concluded that there is
scalar equivalence.

97

Table 6: Construct Equivalence for Justice Variables 2 Region Grouping
Configural Invariance
χ2
Δχ2
df
Δdf
sig.?
GFI
CFI
ΔCFI
PJHire
112.938
26
0.965
0.977
PJTenCont
211.512
26
0.923
0.954
PJPerf
342.860
28
0.883
0.923
PJProm
161.375
26
0.944
0.969
DJAF
44.643
4
0.975
0.990
IJHire
119.629
10
0.941
0.976
IJProm
122.838
10
0.937
0.975
IPJ
435.153
28
0.851
0.916

RMSEA
0.061
0.098
0.118
0.082
0.106
0.116
0.122
0.135

Measurement Invariance

98

PJHire
PJTenCont
PJPerf
PJProm
DJAF
IJHire
IJProm
IPJ

10.914
7.598
1.611
11.726
10.587
3.606
3.187
8.593

6
6
6
6
3
4
4
6

n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
sig.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.

0.962
0.920
0.883
0.940
0.969
0.939
0.936
0.849

0.001
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.001

0.057
0.088
0.106
0.076
0.087
0.098
0.102
0.123

Table 6 (cont’d): Construct Equivalence for Justice Variables 2 Region Grouping
Scalar Invariance
PJHire
47.175
7
sig.
PJTenCont
20.046
7
sig.
PJPerf
7.010
7
n.s.
PJProm
12.062
7
n.s.
DJAF
33.332
4
sig.
IJHire
3.034
5
n.s.
IJProm
6.357
5
n.s.
IPJ
33.697
7
sig.

0.010
0.003
0.000
0.001
0.007
0.001
0.001
0.005

0.061
0.083
0.097
0.070
0.088
0.083
0.088
0.115
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Faculty Control Variables
The construct equivalence test results for the faculty control variables using the
PD grouping are reported in Table 7. Results indicate configural equivalence for all
faculty control variables using the PD grouping. The AF variable required two of the
error variances to be constrained. These constraints were left in place for subsequent
construct equivalence tests. As results indicated between group configural equivalence
for all variables, the next step was to test measurement equivalence.
Based on the chi-squared and CFI difference tests, results indicate measurement
equivalence for the following faculty control variables: PromCont, AF, InfoHire, and
InfoProm. Based on the CFI difference test, results indicate measurement equivalence for
the following faculty control variables: HireCont and PerfCont. As the change in CFI of
the HireCont and PerfCont variables were below acceptable cutoffs, this indicates that
even though the chi-square test was significant, measurement was still culturally
invariant. Therefore, as results indicate between group measurement equivalence for all
variables, the final step was to test scalar equivalence.
Based on the chi-squared and CFI difference tests, results indicate scalar
equivalence for InfoHire. Based on the CFI difference test, results indicate scalar
equivalence for the following faculty control variables: HireCont, PromCont, and
InfoProm. Results indicate scalar variance for the following faculty control variables:
PerfCont and AF. As discussed above, one way to ensure scalar equivalence even when
difference tests suggest cultural variance is to use centered scores. Centering the scores
was done in the HLM program which was used for hypothesis testing. Thus, it can be
concluded that there is scalar equivalence.
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HireCont
PerfCont
PromCont
AF
InfoHire
InfoProm

Table 7: Construct Equivalence for Faculty Control Variables PD Grouping
Configural Invariance
χ2
Δχ2
df Δdf
sig.?
GFI
CFI
ΔCFI
RMSEA
155.275
20
0.945
0.973
0.081
45.496
8
0.977
0.986
0.071
113.635
8
0.940
0.958
0.124
73.136
16
0.968
0.969
0.063
33.991
8
0.982
0.994
0.061
47.944
8
0.973
0.992
0.079

HireCont
PerfCont
PromCont
AF
InfoHire
InfoProm

Measurement Invariance
22.583
18.292
5.764
18.247
7.049
3.419

12
9
9
12
9
9

sig.
sig.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.

21
12
12
43
12
12

sig.
sig.
sig.
sig.
n.s.
sig.

0.937
0.967
0.939
0.961
0.978
0.971

0.002
0.004
0.001
0.004
0.001
0.001

0.067
0.055
0.083
0.050
0.040
0.050

0.003
0.020
0.005
0.043
0.001
0.003

0.058
0.062
0.068
0.060
0.026
0.045

Scalar Invariance
HireCont
PerfCont
PromCont
AF
InfoHire
InfoProm

30.125
66.736
26.219
185.052
4.782
25.439

The construct equivalence test results for the faculty control variables using the 2
Region grouping are reported in Table 8. Results indicate configural equivalence for all
faculty control variables. The AF variable required two of the error variances to be
constrained. These constraints were left in place for subsequent construct equivalence
tests. As results indicated between group configural equivalence for all variables, the next
step was to test measurement equivalence.
Based on the chi-squared and CFI difference tests, results indicate measurement
equivalence for the following faculty control variables: PerfCont, AF, InfoHire, and
InfoProm. Based on the CFI difference test, results indicate measurement equivalence for
the following faculty control variables: HireCont and PromCont. As the change in CFI of
the HireCont and PerfCont variables were below acceptable cutoffs, this indicates that
even though the chi-square test was significant, measurement was still culturally
invariant. Therefore, as results indicate between group measurement equivalence for all
variables, the final step was to test scalar equivalence.
Based on the chi-squared and CFI difference tests, results indicate scalar
equivalence for the following faculty control variables: HireCont and InfoHire. Based on
the CFI difference test, results indicate scalar equivalence for the following faculty
control variables: PromCont and InfoProm. Results indicate scalar variance for the
following faculty control variables: PerfCont and AF. As discussed above, one way to
ensure scalar equivalence even when difference tests suggest cultural variance is to use
centered scores. Centering the scores was done in the HLM program which was used for
hypothesis testing. Thus, it can be concluded that there is scalar equivalence.
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HireCont
PerfCont
PromCont
AF
InfoHire
InfoProm

Table 8: Construct Equivalence for Faculty Control Variables 2 Region Grouping
Configural Invariance
χ2
Δχ2
df Δdf
sig.?
GFI
CFI
ΔCFI
RMSEA
127.696
10
0.954
0.977
0.105
42.602
4
0.979
0.986
0.101
98.520
4
0.955
0.962
0.162
84.253
8
0.964
0.959
0.100
27.793
4
0.986
0.995
0.081
37.564
4
0.980
0.993
0.100

HireCont
PerfCont
PromCont
AF
InfoHire
InfoProm

Measurement Invariance
13.099
1.742
8.792
0.681
2.304
0.084

4
3
3
4
3
3

sig.
n.s.
sig.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.

5
4
4
5
4
4

n.s.
sig.
sig.
sig.
n.s.
sig.

0.949
0.978
0.951
0.964
0.984
0.980

0.002
0.000
0.002
0.002
0.000
0.001

0.092
0.075
0.126
0.080
0.060
0.072

0.000
0.005
0.014
0.018
0.001
0.002

0.079
0.107
0.085
0.081
0.049
0.065

Scalar Invariance
HireCont
PerfCont
PromCont
AF
InfoHire
InfoProm

3.678
17.406
42.398
38.771
4.613
12.032

There were only three items in the TenCont variable which prevented conducting
a construct equivalence test on it. Therefore, I conducted a construct equivalence test on
the seven-factor model used in the faculty control variable CFA. Results for this test are
listed in Table 9. Results of the test conducted on the PD grouping indicate configural
equivalence, measurement equivalence, structural equivalence based on the change in
CFI, and scalar equivalence based on the change in CFI. The Cronbach’s alpha for the
TenCont measure is 0.93 and the standardized estimates for the 3 items are .84, .96, and
.90. All of these are above acceptable cut-offs and therefore it was determined that
TenCont is also culturally invariant and can be used in hypothesis testing.
University Guidelines
Finally, a construct equivalence test was run on the items used to measure
University Guidelines (Guidelines) and the results are reported in Table 10. Results of the
test on the PD grouping indicate configural equivalence, measurement equivalence, and
scalar variance. Results of the test on the 2 Region grouping indicate configural
equivalence, measurement equivalence, and scalar equivalence based on the change in
CFI. Two of the error variances were constrained for these tests. Furthermore, and as
discussed above, one way to ensure scalar equivalence even when difference tests suggest
cultural variance is to use centered scores. Centering the scores was done in the HLM
program which was used for hypothesis testing. Thus, it can be concluded that there is
scalar equivalence.
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Table 9: Construct Equivalence for TenCont
PD Grouping
χ2
Δχ2
df
Δdf
sig.?
Configural
2951.244
1424
Measurement
75.315
66 n.s.
Structural
85.493
63 sig.
Scalar
206.303
87 sig.

GFI
CFI
ΔCFI
RMSEA
0.759
0.924
0.041
0.754
0.001
0.040
0.748
0.001
0.040
0.006
0.040

Table 10: Construct Equivalence for University Guidelines
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PD Grouping
χ2
Δχ2
df
Configural
246.021
Measurement
10.539
Scalar
48.224
2 Region Grouping
Configural
230.721
Measurement
4.724
Scalar
21.563

Δdf

sig.?

32
15 n.s.
18 sig.

16
5 n.s.
6 sig.

GFI
CFI
ΔCFI
RMSEA
0.883
0.926
0.103
0.879
0.002
0.084
0.011
0.076

0.888
0.887

0.927
0.000
0.005

0.144
0.125
0.114

Hypothesis Testing
For the HLM analyses, the first model represents the null model, the second
model includes the control variables and the individual-level independent variables (the
respective governance variable and the guidelines variable), and the third model adds in
the country-level independent variables (the six Hofstede dimensions). For two of the
dependent variables (DJAF and IJHire) in which there were multiple Hofstede
dimensions with main effects, model four represents the added effect of the interactions
between those variables and model five includes the country-level variables as
moderators between the governance/guidelines and the dependent variable. For the other
dependent variables model four adds the country-level variables as cross-level
moderators in the governance and guidelines relationship.

Distributive Justice Models
The results of the HLM analysis for the distributive justice (perceived fairness) of
the level of academic freedom (DJAF) in the respondent’s institution are listed in Table
11. The variance component for the intercept in Model 1 is significant (τ00 = 0.114, p <
.001), indicating that country-level factors impact distributive justice (DJ) perceptions.
The interclass correlation (ICC) is 0.10, which suggests that approximately 10% of the
variance in DJ is due to country-level factors and 90% is due to individual-level factors.
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Table 11: Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results for DJAF
Variable
Individual-Level
Intercept
Years Living
Industry Tenure
Sex
Life One Country
Research
Teaching
AF
Guidelines
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Country-Level
Power Distance (PD)
Individualism (IND)
Masculinity (MAS)
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)
Long-Term Orientation (LT)
Indulgence (INDUL)

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

5.084***(0.114***)

5.033***(0.071***)
0.002(0.000)
-0.008*(0.000)
0.048(0.014)
-0.030(0.062)
0.008(0.029)
-0.186(0.091)
0.769***(0.033)
0.216***(0.002)

5.061***(0.026***)
0.002(0.006)
-0.008*(0.000)
0.055(0.021)
-0.060(0.003)
-0.025(0.021)
-0.152(0.122)
0.767***(0.033)
0.209***(0.004)

5.066***(0.023)
0.003(0.000)
-0.008*(0.000)
0.049(0.024)
-0.065(0.003)
-0.011(0.026)
-0.165(0.140)
0.767***(0.030)
0.210***(0.004)

-0.005*
0.002
-0.002
0.004***
0.004*
0.000

-0.007
0.001
-0.001
-0.008
0.004
0.000

Interactions
PDxUA
PDxLT
UAxLT
Model Deviance
2401.418
1123.119
1106.172
Δ Model Deviance
1278.299***
16.947*
Entries are estimates of fixed effects with robust standard errors. Estimates of variance components
are in parentheses. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

0.000
neg 0.000
0.000
1103.876
2.295

Model 2 includes the control variables and IVs at the individual-level. The
coefficient for time spent in academia (industry tenure) is also significant (γ20 = -0.008, p
< .05) but is a negative relationship. This suggests that faculty perceive less fairness in
academic freedom the longer they are in academia. The coefficient for academic freedom
is significant (γ70 = 0.769, p < .001) as is the coefficient for Guidelines (γ80 = 0.216, p <
.001). Neither of the variance components for these variables is significant suggesting no
country-level differences in the relationship between them and perceived fairness of
academic freedom. Model 3 adds the country-level independent variables. The
coefficients for Hofstede’s dimensions of power distance (PD), (γ01 = -0.005, p < .05),
uncertainty avoidance (UA) (γ04 = 0.004, p < .001) and long term orientation (LT) (γ05 =
0.004, p < .05) are significant. Model 4 adds the country-level interactions. In model 4,
none of the cultural value main affects are significant nor are the interaction affects. The
change in deviance from model 3 to model 4 is also not significant suggesting that model
4 does not explain significantly more of the variance than model 3. Thus, even if there
had been significant interactions, the amount of additional variance explained would not
be statistically significant.
Hypothesis 1a stated that institutional policies and practices that provide more
control to faculty, thereby increasingly in compliance with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines
in assuring academic freedom for faculty, will be seen as the most distributively fair
regardless of country. As mentioned above, the variance components of both Academic
Freedom and Guidelines are not significant suggesting that the more policies and
practices meet UNESCO/AAUP guidelines the fairer they are perceived regardless of
country. Thus, H1a is supported.
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Hypothesis 1b was a competing hypothesis to H1a and stated that there would be
country level differences in fairness perceptions even when institutional policies and
practices are in compliance with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines in assuring academic
freedom for faculty. As mentioned above, the variance components of both Academic
Freedom and Guidelines are not significant suggesting that the more policies and
practices meet UNESCO/AAUP guidelines the fairer they are perceived regardless of
country. Thus, H1b is not supported.
Hypothesis 1c stated that the relationship between institutional policies and
practices to DJ perceptions will be moderated by the cultural dimension of uncertainty
avoidance. Specifically, policies and practices that do not provide guidelines ensuring
academic freedom will be seen as more unfair by individuals from high uncertainty
avoidance countries compared to individuals from low uncertainty avoidance countries.
As stated above, neither of the variance components of Academic Freedom nor
Guidelines were significant suggesting that regardless of country, when policies and
practices do not comply with UNESCO/AAUP standards it is seen as less distributively
fair. Thus, H1c is not supported.
Hypothesis 5a stated that there would be significant interactions between the
cultural dimensions of PD & UA. Both of these cultural dimensions had significant main
effects but the interaction term is not significant. Thus, H5a is not supported.
Procedural Justice Models
The results of the HLM analysis for the Procedural Justice in Hiring (PJHire), in
Tenure/ Contract Decisions (PJTenCont), in Performance Appraisals (PJPerf) and in
Promotion Decisions (PJProm) are listed in Tables 12-15.
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In terms of the perceived fairness of the hiring process, the variance component
for the intercept in Model 1 is significant (τ00 = 0.082, p < .001), indicating that countrylevel factors impact procedural justice (PJ) perceptions. The ICC is 0.07, which suggests
that approximately 7% of the variance in PJ perceptions is due to country-level factors
and 93% is due to individual-level factors. Model 2 includes the control variables and
individual-level independent variables. The relationship between years living and the
perceived fairness of the hiring process is positive and significant (γ10 = -0.124, p < .05)
suggesting that the longer an individual is living in a country, the higher they perceive the
fairness of the hiring process. The relationships between industry tenure (γ20 = -0.007, p <
.05) and sex (γ30 = -0.124, p < .05) to PJ perceptions at the individual level are both
negative and significant. In terms of industry tenure, this suggests that the longer a
faculty member is employed in academia, the lower they perceive the fairness of the
hiring process. In terms of sex, this suggests that females report lower perceived fairness
of the hiring process than their male counterparts. The variance component of life in one
country is significant (τ40 = 0.007, p < .05) suggesting that there are between country
differences in the relationship between life in one country and PJ of the hiring process.
The coefficient for control of the hiring process (ContHire) is significant (γ70 = 0.507, p <
.001) as is the variance component (τ70 = 0.007, p < .05). The coefficient for Guidelines is
significant (γ80 = 0.493, p < .001) as is the variance component (τ80 = 0.029, p < .01).
Taken together this suggests that there are country-level differences in the relationship
between both control of the hiring process and Guidelines and the perceived fairness of
the hiring process. Model 3 adds the country-level independent variables but there are no
significant effects of cultural values. Furthermore, the change in model deviance is not
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significant indicating this model does not explain additional variance compared to model
2.
In terms of the perceived fairness of the tenure/ contract renewal process
(PJTenCont), the variance component for the intercept in Model 1 is significant (τ00 =
0.086, p < .001), indicating that country-level factors impact PJ perceptions. The ICC is
0.07, which suggests that approximately 7% of the variance in PJ perceptions is due to
country-level factors and 93% is due to individual-level factors. Model 2 includes the
control variables and the individual-level independent variables. The variance component
of years living is significant (τ10 = 0.000, p < .01) suggesting a between country
difference in its relationship with the perceived fairness of the tenure/ contract renewal
process. The coefficient for control of the tenure/ contract renewal process (TenCont) is
significant (γ70 = 0.413, p < .001) as is the variance component (τ70 = 0.014, p < .001).
The coefficient for Guidelines is significant (γ80 = 0.625, p < .001) as is the variance
component (τ80 = 0.043, p < .01). Taken together this suggests there are significant
between-country differences in the effects of the control of the tenure/ contract renewal
process and Guidelines on the perceived fairness of the tenure/ contract renewal process.
Model 3 adds the country-level independent variables. The effect of MAS is negative and
significant (γ03 = -0.004, p < .05) but based on the change in deviance, the model does not
explain significantly more variance than model 2.
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Table 12: Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results for PJHire
Variable
Individual-Level
Intercept
Years Living
Industry Tenure
Sex
Life One Country
Research
Teaching
HireCont
Guidelines
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Country-Level
PD
IND
MAS
UA
LT
INDUL

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

4.139***(0.0823***)

4.178***(0.021)
0.007*(0.000)
-0.007*(0.000)
-0.124*(0.001)
-0.019(0.077**)
0.041(0.038)
0.097(0.035)
0.507***(0.007*)
0.493***(0.029**)

4.198***(0.007)
0.004(0.000)
-0.004(0.000)
-0.145*(0.015)
-0.006(0.075)
0.046(0.040)
0.101(0.102)
0.501***(0.008*)
0.507***(0.027**)

4.206***(0.007)
0.004(0.000)
-0.004(0.000)
-0.138*(0.021)
-0.017(0.084**)
0.064(0.044)
0.072(0.118)
0.516***(0.007**)
0.450***(0.028***)

0.006
0.001
-0.003
0.001
-0.001
neg 0.000

0.006
neg. 0.000
-0.003
0.001
-0.001
0.000

Cross-Level Moderations
PDxHireCont
INDxHireCont
UAxHireCont
PDxGuidelines
INDxGuidelines
UAxGuidelines
Model Deviance
2408.983
1034.512
1028.214
Δ Model Deviance
1374.471***
6.299
Entries are estimates of fixed effects with robust standard errors. Estimates of variance components
are in parentheses. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

0.0020
0.0000
0.002*
-0.0030
-0.0010
-0.004**
1019.123
9.091

Table 13: Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results for PJTenCont
Variable
Individual-Level
Intercept
Years Living
Industry Tenure
Sex
Life One Country
Research
Teaching
TenCont
Guidelines
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Country-Level
PD
IND
MAS
UA
LT
INDUL

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

3.928***(0.086***)

3.934***(0.022*)
0.003(0.000*)
-0.004(0.000)
-0.096(0.096)
-0.064(0.033)
0.110(0.110)
0.193(0.118)
0.413***(0.014***)
0.625***(0.043**)

3.93***(0.015)
0.003(0.000**)
-0.003(0.000)
-0.095(0.093)
-0.050(0.044)
0.115(0.127)
0.171(0.116)
0.409***(0.014***)
0.637***(0.041**)

3.95***(0.013)
0.002(0.000**)
-0.003(0.000)
-0.091(0.095)
-0.066(0.031)
0.105(0.135)
0.141(0.063)
0.417***(0.006)
0.626***(0.029)

0.001
-0.002
-0.004*
-0.001
-0.001
0.001

0.001
-0.003
-0.004*
-0.001
-0.001
0.001

Cross-Level Moderations
PDxTenCont
INDxTenCont
UAxTenCont
PDxGuidelines
INDxGuidelines
UAxGuidelines
Model Deviance
2030.670
1001.310
997.039
Δ Model Deviance
1029.360***
4.271
Entries are estimates of fixed effects with robust standard errors. Estimates of variance components
are in parentheses. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Model 4

0.003*
0.0000
0.0010
-0.0020
0.0020
neg. 0.000
981.887
15.152

Table 14: Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results for PJPerf
Variable
Individual-Level
Intercept
Years Living
Industry Tenure
Sex
Life One Country
Research
Teaching
PerfCont
Guidelines

114

Country-Level
PD
IND
MAS
UA
LT
INDUL

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

3.978***(0.040*)

4.021***(0.017)
0.006(0.000)
-0.006(0.000)
-0.102(0.030)
-0.118(0.048)
0.125(0.069)
0.196(0.152)
0.469***(0.005)
0.541***(0.019)

4.054***(0.011)
0.008(0.000)
-0.007(0.000)
-0.095(0.032)
-0.135(0.057)
0.119(0.074)
0.191(0.088)
0.464***(0.002)
0.550***(0.013)

0.001
0.001
-0.005*
0.000
0.001
-0.001

Model Deviance
2201.133
1043.338
1037.807
Δ Model Deviance
1157.795***
5.531
Entries are estimates of fixed effects with robust standard errors. Estimates of variance
components
are in parentheses. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 15: Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results for PJProm
Variable
Individual-Level
Intercept
Years Living
Industry Tenure
Sex
Life One Country
Research
Teaching
PromCont
Guidelines
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Country-Level
PD
IND
MAS
UA
LT
INDUL

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

3.876***(0.092***)

3.896***(0.019)
0.008**(0.000)
-0.010*(0.000)
0.018(0.028)
-0.143*(0.006)
0.167*(0.035)
0.026(0.037)
0.484***(0.023*)
0.624***(0.060)

3.931***(0.011*)
0.008*(0.000)
-0.010**(0.000)
0.018(0.030)
-0.120(0.010)
0.186**(0.051)
0.003(0.027)
0.471***(0.024*)
0.647***(0.048)

3.914***(0.004**)
0.007*(0.000)
-0.009**(0.000)
0.004(0.021)
-0.079(0.015)
0.194*(0.065)
0.010(0.001)
0.469***(0.013***)
0.644***(0.039***)

0.003
-0.001
-0.003*
0.002
0.001
0.002

0.002
-0.002
-0.003*
0.002
0.000
0.002

Cross-Level Moderations
PDxPromCont
INDxPromCont
UAxPromCont
PDxGuidelines
INDxGuidelines
UAxGuidelines
Model Deviance
2165.480
1019.593
1012.325
Δ Model Deviance
1145.887***
7.268
Entries are estimates of fixed effects with robust standard errors. Estimates of variance components
are in parentheses. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

0.032***
0.002***
0.0020
-0.010**
-0.0040
-0.0030
994.565
17.760

In terms of the perceived fairness of the performance review process (PJPerf), the
variance component for the intercept in Model 1 is significant (τ00 = 0.04, p < .05),
indicating that country-level factors impact PJ perceptions. The interclass correlation
(ICC) is 0.03, which suggests that approximately 3% of the variance in procedural justice
perceptions is due to country-level factors and 97% is due to individual-level factors.
Model 2 includes the control variables and the individual-level independent variables.
The coefficient for control of the performance review process is significant (γ70 = 0.469,
p < .01) as is the coefficient for Guidelines (γ80 = 0.541, p < .05). Neither of the variance
components for these variables are significant suggesting no country-level differences in
their effects on the perceived fairness of the performance review process. Model 3 adds
the country-level independent variables. The effect of MAS is negative and significant
(γ03 = -0.005, p < .05) but based on the change in deviance, the model does not explain
significantly more variance than model 2.
In terms of the perceived fairness of the promotion process (PJProm), the variance
component for the intercept in Model 1 is significant (τ00 = 0.092, p < .001), indicating
that country-level factors impact procedural justice perceptions. The ICC is 0.07, which
suggests that approximately 7% of the variance in procedural justice perceptions is due to
country-level factors and 93% is due to individual-level factors. Model 2 includes the
control variables and the individual-level independent variables. The coefficient of years
living is significant (γ10 = 0.008, p < .01) suggesting that the longer a faculty member
lives in the country they are working in, the higher their perceived fairness of the
promotion process. The relationship between industry tenure and PJ of the promotion
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process at the individual level is negative and significant (γ20 = -0.010, p < .05)
suggesting that the longer a faculty member works in academia the lower their
perceptions of the fairness of the promotion process. The relationship between life in one
country and PJ of the promotion process at the individual level is negative and significant
(γ40 = -0.143, p < .01) suggesting that those who obtained their PhDs and are working in
the country they are from have lower fairness perceptions of the promotion process than
those who have spent time outside of the country they are working in. The coefficient of
research is significant (γ50 = 0.167, p < .05) suggesting that faculty working in a research
institution have higher PJ perceptions of the promotion process than those at teaching or
balanced institutions. The coefficient for control of the promotion process (PromCont) is
significant (γ70 = 0.484, p < .001) as is the variance component (τ70 = 0.023, p < .05). The
coefficient for Guidelines is significant (γ80 = 0.624, p < .001) but the variance
component is not. Model 4 adds the country-level independent variables. Once again the
effect of MAS is negative and significant (γ03 = -0.003, p < .05) but based on the change
in deviance, the model does not explain significantly more variance than model 2.
Hypothesis 2a stated that institutional policies that comply with UNESCO/AAUP
guidelines in giving faculty control over governance processes will be seen as more
procedurally fair than those that do not comply regardless of country. The perceived
fairness of hiring, the tenure/ contract renewal process, and the promotion process all had
significant variance components for the control and/or guideline variables. There were no
significant variance components for the control or guideline variables in the perceived
fairness of the performance appraisal process suggesting the more policies and practices
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meet UNESCO/AAUP guidelines regarding performance appraisals, the fairer they are
perceived regardless of country. Thus, H2a is partially supported.
Hypotheses 2b, 2c, and 2d stated the relationship between institutional policies
and practices to PJ perceptions will be moderated by the cultural dimensions of IND
(H2b), PD (H2c), and UA (H2d). Although model 4 in the above tables indicates
significant cross-level moderating effects of the cultural dimensions on the relationship
between policies and practices and fairness perceptions, none of the models that included
those interactions were significantly better fitting than the models that did not included
them. This suggests that these interactions do not explain significantly more variance
than the models that do not include them. Thus, H2b, H2c, and H2d are not supported.
Hypotheses 4 stated that controlling for institutional policies and practices,
perceptions of PJ will be lower for individuals from low PD countries compared to those
from high PD countries. There was not a significant main effect of PD in any of the PJ
models. Thus, H4 is not supported. However, the cultural dimension of MAS did have a
significant and negative relationship in terms of the perceived fairness of the tenure/
contract renewal process, the performance appraisal process, and the promotion process
although this effect did not explain a significantly more amount of variance than models
in which cultural values were not included.
Hypotheses 5b stated there would be a significant interaction between PD and
UA. There were no main effects of these variables so there was no way to test this
hypothesis in the current sample. Thus H5b is not supported.
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Informational Justice Models
The results of the HLM analysis for the Informational Justice in Hiring (IJHire)
and in Promotion Decisions (IJProm) are listed in Tables 16 and 17.
In terms of the perceived fairness of the information provided in hiring (IJHire),
the variance component for the intercept in Model 1 is significant (τ00 = 0.070, p < .001),
indicating that country-level factors impact informational justice (IJ) perceptions. The
ICC is 0.04, which suggests that approximately 4% of the variance in IJ perceptions is
due to country-level factors and 96% is due to individual-level factors. Model 2 includes
the control variables and individual-level independent variables. The relationship
between industry tenure and the perceived fairness of the information provided in hiring
at the individual level is negative and significant (γ20 = -0.009, p < .01) suggesting that
the longer a faculty member works in academia, the lower his/her perceptions of the
fairness of information provided in hiring. The coefficient for the sharing of information
regarding hiring (InfoHire) is significant (γ70 = 0.718, p < .001) as is the variance
component (τ70 = 0.007, p < .01). The coefficient for Guidelines is significant (γ80 =
0.320, p < .001) but the variance component is not. Model 3 adds the country-level
independent variables. The cultural dimensions of PD (γ01 = 0.007, p < .001), IND (γ02 =
0.005, p < .01), and UA (γ04 = -0.003, p < .05) are all significant. In the case of PD and
IND, the relationship is positive so as they increase so too does the perceived fairness of
the information provided regarding hiring. In the case of UA, the relationship is negative
so as it increases the perceived fairness of the information provided regarding hiring
decreases. However, the change in deviance from model 3 compared to model 2 is not
significant suggesting that the cultural main effects do not explain a significantly higher
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amount of variance. Model 4 adds the interaction terms for the country-level variables.
The interaction of PD & IND (γ07 = -0.0002, p < .001) and IND & UA (γ09 = -0.0002, p <
.001) are both negative and significant. In model 4 the variance component of guidelines
also becomes significant (τ80 = 0.017, p < .05). However, the change in deviance
comparing model 4 to model 3 is not significant (p = .65) suggesting that the interaction
terms do not explain a significantly more of the variance than do the variables in model 3.
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Table 16: Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results for IJHire
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Individual-Level
Intercept

3.726***(0.014)

3.701***(0.008*)

3.694***(0.003**)

Years Living

3.719***(0.070***)

0.007*(0.000)

0.007(0.000)

0.008(0.000)

Industry Tenure

-0.009**(0.000)

-0.009**(0.000)

-0.009**(0.000)

Sex

-0.018(0.015)

-0.028(0.016)

-0.027(0.011)

Life One Country

-0.032(0.040)

-0.069(0.000)

-0.075*(0.000)

Research

0.045(0.064)

0.064(0.000)

0.070(0.002)

Teaching

-0.133(0.065)

-0.100(0.122)

-0.086(0.115)

InfoHire

0.718***(0.007**)

0.720***(0.009**)

0.732***(0.009**)

Guidelines

0.320***(0.012)

0.317***(0.016)

0.302***(0.017*)

PD

0.007***

0.013**

IND

0.005**

0.007*

MAS

-0.002

-0.001

UA

-0.003*

-0.012*

LT

-0.002

-0.003

INDUL

-0.001

-0.003

Country-Level
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Interactions
PDxIND

-0.0002***

PDxUA

0.000

INDxUA

-0.0002***

Model Deviance

2461.837

Δ Model Deviance

961.585

952.251

945.106

1500.252***

9.334

7.145+

Entries are estimates of fixed effects with robust standard errors. Estimates of variance components
are in parentheses. + p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 17: Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results for IJProm
Variable
Individual-Level
Intercept
Years Living
Industry Tenure
Sex
Life One Country
Research
Teaching
InfoProm
Guidelines

122

Country-Level
PD
IND
MAS
UA
LT
INDUL

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

3.729***(0.090***)

3.743***(0.042)
0.006(0.000)
-0.003(0.000*)
-0.086(0.028*)
-0.006(0.029*)
-0.014(0.053)
0.004(0.004)
0.735***(0.034***)
0.274***(0.062***)

3.711***(0.034)
0.005(0.000)
-0.002(0.000*)
-0.087(0.029*)
-0.010(0.031*)
-0.012(0.047)
0.014(0.004)
0.737***(0.034***)
0.272***(0.080***)

0.000
0.001
neg 0.000
-0.002*
-0.003
-0.002

Model Deviance
2276.030
841.790
838.030
Δ Model Deviance
1434.24***
3.759
Entries are estimates of fixed effects with robust standard errors. Estimates of variance components
are in parentheses. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

In terms of the perceived fairness of the information provided in the promotion
process (IJProm), the variance component for the intercept in Model 1 is significant (τ00 =
0.090, p < .001), indicating that country-level factors impact IJ perceptions. The ICC is
0.06, which suggests that approximately 6% of the variance in IJ perceptions is due to
country-level factors and 94% is due to individual-level factors. Model 2 includes the
control variables and the individual-level independent variables. The variance component
for industry tenure is significant (τ20 = 0.000, p < .05) suggesting between country
differences in the effect of industry tenure on the perceived fairness of the information
provided regarding promotion decisions. The variance component for sex is significant
(τ30 = 0.028, p < .05) suggesting between country differences in the effect of sex on the
perceived fairness of the information provided regarding promotion decisions. The
variance component for life in one country is significant (τ40 = 0.029, p < .05) suggesting
between country differences in the effect of life in one country on the perceived fairness
of the information provided regarding promotion decisions. The coefficient for the
sharing of information regarding promotion decisions (InfoProm) is significant (γ70 =
0.735, p < .001) as is the variance component (τ70 = 0.034, p < .001). The coefficient for
Guidelines is significant (γ80 = 0.274, p < .001) as is the variance component (τ80 = 0.062,
p < .001). Model 3 adds the country-level independent variables. The cultural dimension
of UA is negative and significant (γ04 = -0.002, p < .05) but based on the change in
deviance the model does not explain significantly more variance than model 2.
Hypothesis 3a stated that institutional policies that comply with UNESCO/AAUP
guidelines regarding transparency in hiring and appraisal results will be perceived as
more informationally fair than those policies that do not comply. The perceived fairness
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of the information provided regarding hiring (IJHire) and promotion (IJProm) both had
significant variance components for the sharing of information and/or guideline variables.
Thus, H3a is not supported.
Hypothesis 3b stated that the relationship between transparency and information
fairness perceptions will be moderated by the cultural characteristic of power distance.
There was a positive and significant main effect of PD on the perceived fairness of the
information provided regarding hiring but not on the perceived fairness of the
information provided regarding promotion decisions. Thus, H3b is partially supported.
Table 18 provides a summary of the results of the hypothesis testing.
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Table 18: Summary of Hypothesis Testing Results
No.
1a (universal)

Hypothesis
Institutional policies and practices that comply with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines in
assuring academic freedom for faculty will be seen as more distributively fair than
those that do not comply. These perceptions will not vary by country.
Institutional policies and practices that comply with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines in
assuring academic freedom for faculty will not be seen as more distributively fair than
those that do not comply. These perceptions will vary by country.
The relationship between institutional policies and practices to distributive justice
perceptions will be moderated by the cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance.
Institutional policies and practices that do not provide guidelines ensuring academic
freedom will be seen as more unfair by individuals from high uncertainty avoidance
countries compared to individuals from low uncertainty avoidance countries.

Result
Supported

2a (universal)

Institutional policies (regarding hiring, tenure/ contract renewal, promotion, and
performance appraisal) that comply with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines regarding
governance processes will be seen as more procedurally fair than those that do not
comply. These perceptions will not vary by county.

Partially Supported
(Regarding Performance
Appraisal)

2b (cultural
effects)

The relationship between institutional policies (regarding hiring, tenure/ contract
renewal, promotion, and performance appraisal) and practices to procedural justice
perceptions will be moderated by the cultural dimension of individualismcollectivism. Institutional policies and practices that leave decision control to a third
party will be seen as more fair by individuals from collectivistic countries than those
from individualistic countries.

Not Supported

2c (cultural
effects)

The relationship between authoritarian decision-making to procedural justice
perceptions will be moderated by the cultural dimension of power distance.
Authoritarian decision-making will be seen as more fair by those from high power
distance countries compared to those from low power distance countries.

Not Supported

1b (cultural
effects)
1c (cultural
effects)

Not Supported

Not Supported
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The relationship of institutional policies (regarding hiring, tenure/ contract renewal,
promotion, and performance appraisal) that provide guidelines for governance
processes to procedural justice will be moderated by the cultural dimension of
uncertainty avoidance. Institutional policies that provide guidelines for governance
processes will be seen as more fair by those from high uncertainty avoidance
countries compared to those from low uncertainty avoidance countries.

Not Supported

3a (universal)

Institutional policies (regarding hiring and promotion) that comply with
UNESCO/AAUP guidelines regarding transparency in employment decisions will be
perceived as more informationally fair than those policies that do not comply. These
perceptions will not vary by county.

Not Supported

3b (cultural
effects)

The relationship between transparency and information fairness perceptions will be
moderated by the cultural characteristic of power distance. Institutional policies
(regarding hiring and promotion) that do not provide for transparency in employment
decisions will be perceived as less informationally fair by those from low power
distance countries compared to those from high power distance countries.

Partially Supported
(Regarding Hiring)

4 (cultural
effects)

Controlling for institutional policies and practices, perceptions of procedural justice
will be lower for individuals from low power distance countries compared to those
from high power distance countries.
Perceptions of distributive justice resulting from institutional policies that comply
with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines regarding academic freedom will be highest for
individuals from countries that are both high in power distance and high in
uncertainty avoidance.

Not Supported
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2d (cultural
effects)

5a (interactive
cultural
effects)
5b (interactive
cultural
effects)

Not Supported

Perceptions of procedural justice resulting from institutional policies that comply with Not Supported
UNESCO/AAUP guidelines regarding governance process will be highest for
individuals from countries that are both low in power distance and high in uncertainty
avoidance.

Discussion
Cross-cultural Distributive Justice
There are three noteworthy findings from the HLM analysis conducted on the
perceived fairness of academic freedom. The first is that, as stated in Hypothesis H1a, the
findings suggest that there are no country-level differences in the relationship of
university policies and practices on the perceived fairness of academic freedom. That is,
the more university guidelines protect academic freedom and the more those policies are
followed, the fairer faculty see it regardless of which country they are working in. This
fits with prior research demonstrating that having clear rules that are followed increases
fairness perceptions (Leventhal, 1980). This is also in-line with the AAUP/UNESCO
standards stating that the protection of academic freedom is of paramount importance for
the academic profession and is recognized as a fundamental principle of the profession
(American Association of University Professors, 2015a). Thus, it seems that academic
freedom is a core value of the profession. Therefore, the finding that the perceived
fairness of a core value of a profession like academic freedom does not vary by country
makes sense given that it has been suggested that core values are particularly resistant to
change or outside influence (Lachman, Nedd, & Hinings, 1994; Ralston, Gustafson,
Cheung, & Terpstra, 1993). Further evidence of the lack of between country differences
in the perceived fairness of academic freedom comes from the fact that the effect of
whether an individual has spent their life living and working in one country is not
significant. That is, these perceptions do not change whether a faculty member is only
exposed to her/his home country fairness norms or is exposed to fairness norms in
multiple countries. Taken together, this suggests that there may be certain aspects of an
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employment relationship that are so inherently important to the nature of the job such that
the absence of which creates an unfair situation.
The second noteworthy finding comes from the significant main effects of the
cultural dimensions. It was found that higher PD countries have lower perceived fairness
of academic freedom. Hofstede (1980a) suggests that those high in PD accept that there
are status differences in society and at work expect their superiors to tell them what to do
(Hofstede et al., 2010). Therefore, one possible explanation for this finding is that as
academic freedom is the ability to research and teach with autonomy, it may be the case
that those who expect to be told what to do have lower fairness perceptions when they are
given autonomy. Essentially, autonomy violates their expectation regarding workplace
norms. Indeed, it has been established that the extent to which expectations are met can
have an impact on justice perceptions with unmet expectations resulting in lower
perceptions of justice (Porter & Steers, 1973). Another possible explanation mentioned in
Chapter II is that those high in power distance are more inclined to focus on their rewards
(Breland et al., 2011; Tyler et al., 2000). Therefore, all things being equal, those high in
power distance have lower perceptions of justice in this case because they are particularly
sensitive to assurances of academic freedom (a reward for being faculty).
It was also found that there are significant positive relationships of UA and LT
with the perceived fairness of academic freedom. In the case of UA, this is perhaps due to
the fact that those individuals seeking to reduce uncertainty (those having high UA) look
for cues that things are “normal” or following an established set of expectations. As
academic freedom is a core value of the profession, when faculty from high UA countries
have academic freedom, this provides evidence that things are normal, certain and more
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in line with their expectations. Justice effects have been demonstrated to be stronger for
those in high uncertainty avoidance countries (Shao et al., 2013) which explains why the
perceived fairness of academic freedom goes up as UA does. Regarding the cultural
dimension main effect of LT, this is the first study that I am aware of to find evidence
that LT may be a factor in distributive justice perceptions. The dearth of research in the
justice literature on this dimension leaves us to speculate as to the reasons for this
finding. As suggested in Chapter II, individuals from long-term oriented countries are
more likely to focus on maintaining relationships and the possibility of future rewards
(Hofstede et al., 2010). This suggests they might be more concerned with procedural and
interactional fairness and not with distributive fairness. However, people from short-term
oriented societies are more likely to be concerned with immediate rewards (Hofstede et
al., 2010). Therefore, the current findings might be the result of people from short-term
oriented countries having lower perceived fairness of academic freedom because they are
particularly attuned to reward fairness.
The third noteworthy finding is the fact that the effect of industry tenure has a
negative relationship with the perceived fairness of academic freedom. That is,
AAUP/UNESCO guidelines state that tenure needs to be protected as a way to protect
academic freedom and that once tenure is obtained, faculty supposedly have complete
academic freedom. In some countries, like Australia and China, tenure is essentially
given as soon as a faculty member becomes employed at a university. However, there are
many countries that, like the US, have a probationary period in which new faculty must
meet certain criteria in order to be granted tenure. Regardless of whether tenure is granted
at the initial employment stage or after a probationary period, it would seem logical to
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assume based on AAUP/UNESCO guidelines that once a faculty member has tenure or
its functional equivalent, they would not see academic freedom eroded over time.
However, the negative relationship of length of industry employment with the perceived
fairness of academic freedom suggests this is not the case. This begs the question of what
is causing this unexpected relationship. This could stem from a situation like that in the
UK (move from tenure to fixed-term contracts) and Finland (perceived erosion of
freedom when a US style tenure system was introduced) in which faculty see changes in
university structures over time. That is, faculty have a certain level of expectations
regarding their academic freedom and when those expectations are no longer met (Porter
& Steers, 1973), this lowers their perceptions of justice. Or, in a worse case, faced with a
perceived reduction in academic freedom it causes a faculty member to withdraw from a
university. A recent example of this occurred at Northwestern when a faculty member
resigned in protest after feeling her work was being censored by the University’s
administration (Kingkade, 2015). Another possible explanation comes from faculty
seeing an erosion of academic freedom that results in adverse employment actions on a
colleague. There was recently a case in which a faculty member was terminated from a
tenured position for his/her personal feelings regarding a socially sensitive subject that
were posted on an online website (American Association of University Professors,
2015b). This seems a direct violation of academic freedom and given that injustice
witnessed by an individual but bestowed on a third party can still impact perceptions of
justice (Tabibnia et al., 2008), this could also explain the reduction in the perceived
fairness of academic freedom the longer a faculty member is working in academia.
However, this finding could also be coming from some other aspect of the faculty
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employment relationship like the erosion of academic freedom in the classroom. Indeed,
recent attention has been drawn to the increased expectation that instructors give students
“trigger warnings” when they intend to display or discuss potentially offensive material
(American Association of University Professors, 2014b). The necessary inclusion of a
trigger warning is seen as an erosion of academic freedom in the classroom (American
Association of University Professors, 2014b). Either way, the cross-sectional nature of
this study does not provide for answers to these questions and is a limitation to this
research.

Cross-cultural Procedural Justice
There were a number of interesting findings from the analysis of the procedural
justice dependent variables. Like the distributive justice findings discussed above, the
perceived fairness of the performance appraisal process did not differ based on country
when policies and practices followed AAUP/UNESCO standards. This is perhaps not
surprising given the relatively low ICC (.03) but is important none-the-less as it lends
further credence to procedural justice research indicating that when employees have
voice and control in employment processes it is generally seen as more fair regardless of
country (Greenberg & Folger, 1983; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). However, these findings
were not duplicated in the other aspects of procedural justice investigated in this study.
Specifically, there were between country differences in the effect of guidelines and
practices on the perceived fairness of hiring, tenure/ contract renewals, and promotion. In
fact, with ICCs around .07, there does seem to be a fair amount of country-level effect in
this relationship. Although the cross-level interactions do indicate that country level
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dimensions moderate the relationship between policies, practice and procedural justice
perceptions, the non-significance of the change in deviance statistic of the models that
have cross-level interactions and those that do not indicate that the effects are not
explaining a significant amount of additional variance. The fact that the current study is
looking at general justice perceptions may help explain this. That is, much of the justice
literature looks at justice perceptions in relation to a specific event in the employment
relationship that has a direct impact on the respondent (last pay raise, most recent
performance appraisal, etc.). However, this study asks for more general fairness
perceptions of the employment relationship which may make justice perceptions less
salient for the individual. This, in turn, may reduce the effect that the cultural values
might have. Thus, the moderating effects of the cultural dimensions may prove more
important in other situations.
Continuing this point, although none of the procedural justice models that
included the cultural dimensions were better fitting than the models with individual-level
variables only, the fact that the cultural dimension of masculinity is significant in all of
them is important to note. Perhaps this is due to the fact that masculine societies value
competition (Hofstede, 1980a) and control over process is perceived as a way to ensure
that they “win”. Regardless of the theoretical reasoning, the current findings suggest that
it may be worthwhile to conduct further research into the effects of the masculinityfemininity dimension on justice perceptions. As noted previously, there is a dearth of
research on this cultural value and the significant effect indicates that it is an important
cultural value for researchers to consider.
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Years living in one country is significant at the individual level for the perceived
fairness of hiring and promotion and at the country level for the perceived fairness of
tenure/ contract renewals. This suggests that the longer you live in a country, the more
fair you see the hiring and promotion processes. One possible explanation for this is that
perceptions of organizational justice can be influenced by others, such as co-workers and
team members. Recent research suggests that team level perceptions of justice form what
is called a ‘justice climate’ which can impact individuals’ own views of justice (Li &
Cropanzano, 2009). Employees working within a team may share their perceptions with
one another which can lead to a shared interpretation of the fairness of events (Roberson
& Colquitt, 2005; Roberson & Williamson, 2012). It has also been suggested that
individuals can “learn” justice evaluations from team members and these can lead to
homogeneity of justice perceptions within teams, creating a strong justice climate
(Roberson & Colquitt, 2005). Thus, group-level perceptions of justice can be
conceptualized as an antecedent to individuals’ justice perceptions. Indeed the link
between team and justice climate to individual perceptions of justice has been made
extensively in the justice literature (Colquitt et al., 2005; Elovainio, Kivimauki, Eccles, &
Sinervo, 2002). Another interpersonal influence on justice perceptions is culture. As
mentioned previously, justice seems to matter to people all over the world (Leung, 2005),
but reactions differ in different countries (Brockner et al., 2001; Erdogan & Liden, 2006;
Shao et al., 2013). Taken together this explains how people living in one country become
socialized to new fairness norms and explains the significant difference that years living
in one country has on the perceived fairness of hiring and promotion.
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It is also interesting that industry tenure has a negative relationship with the
perceived fairness of hiring and promotion. This could represent the fact that as you
spend more time in academia, you have more opportunity to be denied a job you feel
qualified for or see others be denied a job that you think they are qualified for. It could
also represent a departure from the process and as you get further from a personal
experience with the hiring process (because you have been employed at the same
institution for a long time) your perceptions of fairness about that process decline.
Finally, it might simply be from the fact that once you become a faculty member and you
see the process from the other side, you perceive it as less fair than when you are unaware
of how the process works.
The fact that women in this sample report lower perceptions of justice in hiring
than their male counterparts is interesting. Answers as to why this is happening were not
the focus of the research conducted here but it is worth mentioning given the troublesome
nature of the finding. As a means of speculation, this finding could be the result of
women seeing the hiring process result in few female hires thereby deeming it less fair
than their male counterparts (the sample from the survey was only 36% female and there
is no reason to believe that this represents a departure from the percentage of female
faculty members that exists in the full population). Or perhaps this is the result of women
witnessing some other type of discrimination in the hiring process itself. Either way, this
is clearly an area for future research. However, it is a positive sign that the effect of sex is
not significant in other procedural aspects of the employment relationship like tenure/
contract renewal or promotion decisions. Therefore, and luckily, at least in the current
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analysis, it seems that women feel that there are not other areas of the employment
relationship in which there is gender discrimination.
It is interesting to note that respondents from research institutions reported higher
perceptions if justice in the promotion process than those from teaching or balance
focused institutions. This could be the result of clearer guidelines and expectations at
research institutions due to the fact that they often have an externally valid promotion
system. That is, in order to be promoted at a research institution, it is expected that you
have publications. These publications are widely available to academics inside and
outside of a university that a particular faculty member is working in. Therefore,
someone outside the university may look at the number or quality of publications a
faculty member has and say that they either deserve or do not deserve a promotion at that
institution. In fact, it is not uncommon for research-focused institutions to request
external reviews of a faculty member’s credentials before granting that faculty member a
promotion. This adds external legitimacy to the process and may explain the significant
result found here. On the other hand, evaluations of teaching proficiency can be more
open to subjectivity and therefore respondents from institutions that rely heavily on such
evaluations for promotion may have a system that is seen as less fair.

Cross-cultural Informational Justice
As with the perceived fairness of hiring and promotion, here we also see between
country differences in the relationship between policies and practices and IJ. It is
interesting to note however that there is only a significant difference in the relationship
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between policies and IJ of hiring when the cultural value interaction terms are entered
into the model.
That being said, IJ of hiring is the only justice variable in this sample to have
significant interaction terms of the cultural values. Even considering the model does not
explain significantly more variance than the model that does not contain the interaction
terms, it is still an interesting finding. This provides some initial evidence of the potential
interactive effects of cultural values, which could help further our understanding of how
culture works. Continuing with the discussion of the cultural dimensions, support for the
effect of power distance was present for IJ of hiring but not for IJ of promotion. This
furthers our understanding of the PD dimension as it provides more evidence that those
high in PD are more focused on their personal rewards (Tyler et al., 2000). That is, the
hiring process of another faculty member is unlikely to affect a faculty member’s rewards
but the promotion process directly affects individual rewards. Thus, faculty in high PD
countries may be more inclined to let university authority figures make hiring decisions
and not require any explanations for those decisions. However, when that same faculty
member is faced with a promotion possibility, s/he does require more information as
receiving or not receiving a promotion could impact her/his rewards. Although there was
no hypothesis regarding the effect of individualism on informational justice the
significance of this cultural value is not surprising to see given the significant effect of
power distance. This is due to the fact that individualism and power distance are highly
correlated. The significant effect of UA is interesting as it seems to suggest that
information is a way to mitigate uncertainty and the absence of such information is seen
as more unfair by those in high UA countries. This effect also holds in IJ of promotion
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although the amount of variance explained by the model with country-level variables
included is not significantly different from the model with only individual-level variables.
It is also noteworthy that like PJ of hiring, the effect of industry tenure is
significant and negative for IJ of hiring. Interestingly, industry tenure is also significant
in IJ of promotion but it is significant in terms of between country differences. Perhaps
this is due to the fact that the longer one is in academia, the more opportunities there are
for there to be communication gaps between decision makers and faculty. It could also
indicate a recent trend similar to what occurred in Denmark in which one of my
respondents reported their system going from one of the most democratic in the world in
which faculty had most of the decision making authority to one of the least in which
decision making is concentrated amongst university authority figures.
Also, like in PJ of hiring, we see the effect of life in one country as significant in
IJ of hiring but here it is significant at the individual level. This effect is also negative
indicating that those who have spent their whole lives in one country have lower
perceptions of justice than their counter-parts who have not. Life in one country is also
significant in the IJ of promotion relationship but it is the between country differences
driving that significance. The effects of life in one country on both IJ of hiring and IJ of
promotion may suggest that exposure to different cultures and fairness norms broaden
what one considers fair. Take for example reward allocation preferences. There is a
plethora of evidence of a preference for equitable rewards in individualistic countries
(Benjamin, 2011; Fischer & Smith, 2003; Giacobbe-Miller et al., 2003) but we also see
preference for reward allocation change with exposure to new organizational goals in
collectivistic societies (C. C. Chen et al., 2002; He et al., 2004). Thus, it may be the case
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that some justice perceptions are somewhat fluid and that exposure to new fairness norms
can shape those perceptions.
Finally, the between-country effect of sex on IJ of promotion is significant
indicating that in some countries women report different justice perceptions than their
counterparts in other countries. It is possible that this is the result of unequal treatment
that women are subjected to in some countries and adds further support for the
differences in justice perceptions based on sex (Lee & Farh, 1999; Lee, Pillutla, & Law,
2000).
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Summary of Studies 1 & 2
The two studies undertaken in the present research sought to use triangulation to
answer three important research questions: (1) Are justice perceptions universal or are
they affected by cultural values; (2) is there an interactive effect of cultural dimensions
on justice perceptions; and (3) what is the extent that faculty governance differs crossculturally and the effect of these variations on perceptions of fairness?
The first study was qualitative and began answering the first and third research
questions by establishing the extent to which faculty governance differs cross-culturally
and the effect on justice perceptions. The semi-structured interviews indicated variation
in faculty governance systems but suggested ambiguity as to whether or not similarly
structured systems were perceived as equally fair across countries. Faculty governance
ranged from situations in which there were no written guidelines or standardized
procedures for any aspect of the employment relationship to systems that were
thoroughly vetted through extensive written policies that protected academic freedom, the
employment relationship, and created standardized practices. Interviewees also indicated
that the transparency of employment actions communicated through information seemed
to play a large role in the perceived fairness of the employment relationship. This is inline with psychological contract literature that suggests that employees seek information
as a means to monitor and negotiate their environment (Shore & Tetrick, 1994). Indeed,
information seeking behaviors have been shown to increase when employees are
concerned about advancement and rewards in the work place (De Vos, Buyens, & Schalk,
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2005) and provides further validation of the reported need that faculty had for
information transparency. The results from this study suggested that testing hypotheses
looking at whether or not the perceived fairness of academic freedom, hiring, tenure/
contract renewal, performance review, and promotion processes were universally held to
one standard or culturally variant was worthwhile. This study also suggested that in
addition to looking at the fairness of information provided by authority figures in the
promotion process, it was necessary to look at the fairness of the information provided in
the hiring process. These results were then used to inform the Study 2 survey.
The second study was quantitative and answered research question two as well as
completing the answer to questions one and three. In completing the answer to the first
and third research questions this study may have uncovered the most interesting findings
from this research and clarified some of the ambiguous results found in Study 1. That is,
it was demonstrated that academic freedom seems to be a universal concern for faculty no
matter what country they are working in. This indicates that there are some aspects of the
employment relationship that may be culturally invariant. Essentially, if faculty feel they
lack a very basic tool they need to successfully complete their job, they will see an unfair
work environment. This is akin to asking a car washer to wash cars without sponges.
Without this basic tool necessary to successfully complete their job, of course they would
see it as an unfair working environment! However, this study also indicated that there are
some aspects of the employment relationship in which policies and procedures found
unfair in one country might not be deemed unfair in another. There was cross-national
variation in the perceived fairness of policies and practices regarding hiring, tenure/
contract renewal, and promotion processes as well as the information provided regarding
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hiring and promotion. This provided evidence that there is cultural variation in the
perceived fairness of the employment relationship for university faculty.
To finalize the answer to question one, hierarchical linear modeling analysis
indicated that Hofstede’s cultural dimensions did not have wide spread significant
relationships either directly on justice perceptions or as a moderating effect between
institutional policies and practices and justice perceptions. Thus, although it seems that
culture does play a role in the relationships investigated here, Hofstede’s cultural values
do not explain this role. There were a number of explanations for these findings discussed
above but an additional one comes from the idea of justice heuristics. That is, the current
study did not take a deep dive into how justice perceptions are formed in individual
countries. This omission is an area of future research.
There were also a number of other interesting findings that came out of finalizing
the answer to research question three including how the effect of some of the control
variables is different depending on the type of employment action (hiring, tenure,
promotion, etc.) and/or depending on the country in which faculty are working. This
lends further credence to the studies demonstrating that definitions of fairness can be
culturally variant (Guo & Giacobbe-Miller, 2012; Leung, 2005).
Finally, in answering the second question, there was only one model in which
there were significant interactions and that involved perceptions of informational justice
in the hiring process. The lack of significant results here can also be explained by the
above mentioned idea of justice heuristic. That is, without knowing how individuals from
a given country perceive justice, it is difficult to make accurate predictions about how
cultural values might affect that relationship.
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Contributions
By completing this research it is hoped that I have contributed to the literature in
three important ways. First, to my knowledge this is the only organizational justice study
involving a sample of 47 countries. This has allowed for an understanding as to the extent
that culture actually influences justice perceptions. That is, the hierarchical linear
modeling approach used has demonstrated the amount of variance in justice perceptions
that can be attributed to the country level. It is intriguing as well that the amount of
variance in justice perceptions depends on the aspect of the employment relationship
being studied. Specifically, only three percent of the variance was attributable to the
country level when it came to the performance review process but ten percent when it
came to academic freedom. This should help guide cross-cultural justice researchers
going forward by further clarifying when a cultural effect may or may not be found.
Specifically, if the county-level variance of a certain aspect of the employment
relationship is low (i.e. there is little higher level effect) an investigation using cultural
dimensions may not be warranted. If, however, there is a large percentage of variance
attributable to the country level, further investigation of cultural effects would be a
worthwhile research endeavor.
Second, this research has demonstrated that there may be core values of some
professions that are culturally invariant. In the case of academic freedom, we see that
reactions to policies and practices did not vary at the country level. Thus, the more
policies and practices protect academic freedom in-line with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines,
the fairer faculty see it regardless of country. This suggests that the extent to which crosscultural variation is found might depend on what aspect of the employment relationship
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participants in research are being asked about. Therefore, as cross-cultural justice
research continues, it will be important for researchers to be aware of what aspect of the
employment relationship they are investigating.
Third, although there has been a significant amount of research looking at the
relationship between Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and justice perceptions, the current
research suggests that there may be alternative explanations for how culture affects
justice. Although there were some significant effects of the Hofstede dimensions on
justice judgments, these effects did not generally explain country level differences in
justice perceptions. There was however a significant amount of country-level variation in
justice perceptions. Thus, researchers may want to look for other possible explanations
for culture that have more power than the Hofstede dimensions. Given the evidence
found here of the differences in justice heuristics between countries, the best way of
doing this may be to conduct more indigenous studies (Tsui, 2004) that provide for a
local understanding of the justice construct.

Limitations & Directions for Future Research
One limitation of this research is that given the number of countries sampled, the
resources were not available to interview or survey in the native language of each
country. This is a limitation because language is a prominent means by which culture is
maintained (Hall, 1966) as well as how it shapes behavior, interactions and beliefs
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966). This not only limited the robustness of information
obtained but also limited the range of countries sampled. Not only were very few African
and Latin American countries represented in this study but also the countries sampled in
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Study 1 were not all sampled in Study 2. Despite this limitation, there was a strong
presence of Asia-Pacific countries and the overall representation of 47 unique countries is
the most comprehensive cross-cultural justice study conducted to date. However, future
research should focus on some of the less well-understood regions of the world.
Another limitation of this study is that it is cross-sectional in nature. The finding
that some fairness perceptions (particularly in the case of academic freedom) decrease as
years employed in academe increases is interesting but a longitudinal study may have
been able to further determine why this is occurring. The CAP survey has taken two
snapshots of the faculty employment relationship, which has provided for a general
feeling of how faculty perceived their employment relationship. Specifically, faculty
were asked about the extent they felt satisfied with their current job. Percentages of
respondents to this question that indicated they were very highly or highly satisfied with
their jobs ranged from a low of forty-seven in the UK to a high of eighty-seven in Mexico
(Locke et al., 2011) and this had increased between the first CAP survey and second.
Therefore, it would be beneficial to understand how faculty members fairness perceptions
have changed over time especially given the positive correlation between organizational
justice and job satisfaction (Colquitt et al., 2001).
Comparing the measurement and loading patterns of survey responses in one
country to those in all of the other countries in a sample is how cross-cultural construct
equivalence is conducted. Given the number of countries represented in this study, it was
not possible to conduct construct equivalence testing in this manner. Therefore, the
manner in which the constructs represented here are the same country to country is not
known and is another limitation of this study. However, the two substitute methods
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(groupings) that were used do provide some evidence of construct equivalence but further
validation of the equivalence of the constructs is necessary in future research.
Finally, data was obtained from a sample of essentially one type of employee
working in one industry. Although educated individuals (i.e. faculty in universities) have
been shown to be well indoctrinated in their country’s value systems (Taras, Kirkman, &
Steel, 2010) and thus accurate representations of their cultural groups, generalizability of
these results is somewhat limited. Future research should test these findings in other
organizational settings.
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